On the one hand, the Bush administration recently publicly humiliated President Hu Jintao during his visit to the White House in April. But it also appeared to be offering an olive branch of sorts to Beijing shortly afterward, by denying Taiwanese President Chen Shui-Bian permission to make a refueling stop in the continental United States en route to Latin America. From this it is clear that today, the United States cannot afford to alienate China completely, while Iran's nuclear program remains unresolved. Fact is also however, that America no longer felt secure and soon will not feel confident with a China allying itself with an increasingly assertive and unfriendly Russia. In fact one could see the beginnings of a new bipolar world order in which America is not the predominant power. As a result, the United States will no longer feel that it can accommodate unjustifiable Chinese conduct. When perceptions in America change, all we know about the current geopolitical landscape will be obsolete.What made this clear, was the refusal for China to back UN sanctions against Iran so far (May 12, 2006) pointing to the fact that China from now on is an enemy of the US, yet not strong enough to pose immediate dangers to the U.S. It appears therefore that the U.S. is currently, planning its policies based on this fundamental understanding. Since no one wants to have a shooting war with China and serious efforts should be put into avoiding one, Washington therefore at the same time should also try to encourage China become a responsible stakeholder. We suggest that the priority should be crystal clear -- treat China as an enemy first and then try to change it into a friend later.
America was relatively quick to recognize the challenge posed by the Soviets after the Second World War, but that was because the challenge was unmistakable. The Chinese challenge, on the other hand, is more subtle. Yet just because it's discreet does not mean that it is less of a challenge.
It therefore was a mistake from the Clinton administration for cozying up to China because they helped his political career. The shortsightedness of the US business elite during this period, were one of the major reasons for the growth of the Chinese geopolitical and economic clout. The Chinese are not less greedy of course - but the US needed the extensive borrowing from China.
But, the more recent planning of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan in the belief that destroying the authoritarian/totalitarian regimes would help spread the benign Pax Americana was also a mistake.
The Chinese argued strenuously for a full state visit complete with a black-tie state dinner. They got an official state lunch and a welcome on the White House grounds. Things went downhill from there.
The United States has openly discussed a hedge strategy on China, under which economic relations would proceed while the United States increased its military presence in the region as a hedge against future trouble. China, for its part, has been more than a little troublesome in areas where the United States does not want it to be, particularly during the current confrontation with Iran.
China and the United States are bound together economically. That is one of the major problems, since they need very different things. The Chinese economy, is not doing nearly as well as its growth rate would indicate. We won't rehash our views on that. However, the economic reality creates an obvious tension. Chinese exports are surging at very low or nonexistent profit margins in order to sustain a financial system that has accrued a nonperforming loan burden that is, by some measures, as high as 60 percent of gross domestic product. The United States is addicted to Chinese imports, and China is addicted to exporting to the United States. The United States wants China to revalue the yuan in order to raise the price of Chinese exports. The Chinese, eager to maintain and increase exports, have no intention of allowing a meaningful rise in the yuan.
There are other forces binding the two countries together as well. The most important is Chinese money -- which is flowing out to other countries precisely because China is no longer a particularly attractive place for Chinese investment. There is serious capital flight under way, as money is redeployed to safer havens. The safest haven from the Chinese point of view is the United States -- thus, Chinese investment there is surging. And the United States needs this money. In this sense, both countries are in a death-lock. There is no other economy that is as large, liquid and safe as the American economy. Chinese investors need their funds to be in the United States. And there is no larger pool of cash than China's to finance U.S. debt.
This means that there is no divorce looming in Sino-U.S. relations. But at the same time, it must be noted that, despite very close connections between China and Japan, Sino-Japanese relations have deteriorated remarkably -- and it is China that has driven the estrangement. The reasons are political: China's government has domestic problems, and patriotic fervor will tend to buttress Beijing's power. Japan is still deeply hated for its behavior in World War II, and attacking Japanese behavior is good politics. The Chinese have strained relations with Japan nearly to the breaking point.
What is important here is this: It must not be assumed that China is driven purely by economic considerations. In the case of Japan, Beijing clearly has subordinated the economic advantage of having smooth relations with Tokyo to its own domestic considerations. Now, Japan is not the United States -- it is a significant country for China, but not economically decisive in the way that the United States is. The Chinese have more room for maneuver there. At the same time, it must be understood that China is playing a complex game, and while making money is up there on the priority list, it is not the only thing up there. Preserving national unity in the face of centrifugal forces and foreign power also matters a great deal to the Chinese.
It is therefore time to stop to consider China's national strategy in the long run, and therefore, to consider China's geopolitics.
Beginning, as is necessary, with the outlines of China's national boundaries, we are immediately struck by the fact that China is, in many ways, an island. To the east are the South and East China Seas. To the northeast is Siberia, thinly inhabited and to a great extent uninhabitable. Some limited military expansion in that direction is possible, but a large population could not be sustained. To the direct north is Mongolia -- occasionally part of China, occasionally the ruler of China, but currently a fairly unimportant area, not worth projecting force into. To the southwest are the Himalayas. There is frequent talk of India as balancing China, but this is, in fact, meaningless. They are as much separated as if there were a wall. There can be skirmishes along the dividing line in the Himalayas, but no massive movement of armies.
In the southeast, there is Indochina. China could expand there, but the last time there were land-based skirmishes, in 1979, Vietnam beat the Chinese soundly (though both sides claimed victory). Jungles and mountains stretching from eastern India to the South China Sea make that region impassable, even without the need for self-defense. Finally, there are the western approaches into Central Asia, through Kazakhstan. This has been the traditional, and in some ways only, route for Chinese aggression. China is certainly deeply involved in Central Asia, but its own region of Xinjiang is both Muslim and hostile to Beijing. It does not provide a base for launching invasions, even if one was wanted.
For these reasons, China must be viewed as one of the most insular great powers in the world. It has occupied most of the terrain that is accessible to it; what remains is either inaccessible, undesirable or quite able to defend itself. China's great interest, therefore, should be the oceans. Over the past 20 years, China has become a major exporter and thus should have a great interest in securing its sea lanes. But China's coastal waters are effectively controlled by the U.S. 7th Fleet. Constructing a navy that could challenge the U.S. Navy would take a fortune, which China probably has, but also one or two generations would be needed -- not only for construction, but for establishing a military culture suitable for an aggressive naval force.
Most important, challenging the U.S. Navy with a Chinese navy cannot be done regionally. The United States has fleets other than the 7th Fleet, and if the U.S. Navy were concentrated against China, the Chinese could not fight a defensive battle. They would have to take the fight to the Americans, and that would mean fielding a global naval force. China might one day have that, but they do not have it now. In this sense, the standard concerns about a Chinese invasion of Taiwan are not realistic. China does not have a naval force capable of taking control of the Taiwan Strait, nor the amphibious force needed to gain significant lodgment in Taiwan, nor therefore -- and this is the key -- the ability to sustain a multidivisional force in Taiwan.
China does not have many regional options with conventional forces nor, for that matter, does it face a conventional threat from within the region. China's primary geopolitical problem, and thus its chief military mission, is domestic. China is a highly diverse and fragmented country; maintaining control of the current extent of the country is the major strategic problem. Unlike most nations, whose external geopolitical problems define their military thinking, China's internal geopolitical problems drive its military planning.
There are two dimensions to these problems. The first is ethnic: China occupies areas like Xinjiang, Tibet and Manchuria that are ethnically distinct and sometimes restive. The other and deeper problem, however, is not ethnic but regional. China has a large coastal plain. It also has a vast interior that is mountainous. The tension between those two regions historically has been a great challenge that China has faced.
The interior is heavily driven by agriculture -- subsistence agriculture. It is extraordinarily poor, and arable land is minimal. The coastal regions are relatively better off, to the extent to which they conduct international trade through coastal ports. Thus, China has had two realities. In one, the coastal regions were cut off from the rest of the world, and there was a rough equality between the regions. Until the British showed up in the 19th century, for example, trading with foreigners had been illegal. After the British forced China open, the coastal regions boomed, and the country fragmented; the coastal regions, manipulated by foreigners who were in turn manipulated, turned outward to the ocean, while the interior stagnated. Mao tried to create a revolution in Shanghai and failed. Instead, he went on his Long March to Yenan in the interior, raised a peasant army from there, and came back to conquer the coast. He also closed off China from the world, creating poverty but relative unity.
Deng gambled with the idea that he would be able to have his cake and eat it too. He opened China to the world, thereby enriching the coastal regions and recreating the tension that Mao had sought to abolish. For 30 years, Deng's gamble worked. Now it is breaking down. Beijing is urgently trying to shift resources from the wealthy coastal regions to the restive interior. The coastal provinces naturally are resisting. The great question is whether Beijing will be able to juggle the two realities, whether China will again turn inward to maintain geopolitical integrity or if it will fragment further into warring regions.
Balancing the two indefinitely is the least likely outcome. But China does have one other card to play, which is patriotism. The Communist Party has little legitimacy at this point, but the idea of China -- particularly among ethnic Chinese of whatever region -- is not a trivial driver. In order to generate patriotic fervor, however, there must be a threat and an enemy. At this point, the Chinese are using the Japanese in order to sustain patriotism. Reclaiming Taiwan would stir the spirits and reduce regional tensions, but this, as we have pointed out, would be militarily difficult in any conventional way. Moreover, it would bring a confrontation with the United States.If we accept the idea that maintaining the territorial integrity of China is its greatest geopolitical imperative and that regional prosperity comes second for Beijing, it follows that the government will attempt to impose its will on the coast, and trade and economic concerns will come second. Beijing's interest in having smooth trade relations wanes, both because the wealth gap exacerbates tensions between the regions and because the interest runs counter to its need for external confrontation. It follows from this that China's primary interest -- and ability -- would be to maintain security in China, and that foreign adventures would be avoided except under circumstances in which they would have a high probability of success and would serve internal political interests.
A secondary goal would be to protect China's coast from foreign encroachment. Imagine the following scenario: Business and Party interests in the coastal region are resisting Beijing's efforts to bring them under control and impose taxes. The situation becomes unstable, and Western interests, investments and the expatriate community living there are jeopardized. Through some political contrivance, these local leaders position themselves as the regional authority and ask for American intervention. The United States decides to intervene. Given that this is roughly what happened in the late 19th and early 20th centuries in China -- during which time there was a major American presence in Shanghai -- it is not as far-fetched as it might seem.Under these circumstances, the government in Beijing would be forced to resist or abdicate. So, if the primary interest of China is the maintenance of internal security, a secondary interest would be deterring foreign interventions in the event of instability. The tertiary interest would be some form of force projection in the region, particularly against Taiwan -- which not only could be regarded as an internal security matter but would provide the regime with patriotic credibility.
If we accept the premises that China's major resources will go to the army for security purposes, and that China is at least a generation away from having a significant naval force, then what military options do the Chinese have? Obviously, one is its nuclear force. That is a serious deterrent; nations have attacked nuclear powers (Egypt and Syria against Israel in 1973) but not for the fairly marginal reasons the United States might have to get involved in China at some hypothetical future date. But given that deterrence runs both ways, nuclear stalemate always leaves opportunities for subnuclear threats.
The prime military lever within China's reach is not sea-lane control, but rather sea-lane denial. Using anti-ship missiles, the Chinese could impose heavy attrition on the sea-lanes leading to Taiwan and even potentially interdict Japan's sea-lanes. This would not guarantee China control of the sea-lanes, and that is a problem if China is importing oil by sea. However, in extremis, it would hurt Taiwan and Japan more than China. And if the Chinese had systems that could threaten to overload U.S. Aegis and follow-on systems designed to protect warships, then it could force the 7th Fleet to retreat as well. The tactic would serve as a deterrent against intervention and as a suitable secondary system to supplement the army. It would also serve as a threat to the interests, if not the survival, of Taiwan.
All of this is of course hypothetical and speculative. It assumes that the current trends in Chinese relations with Japan and the United States are merely road bumps rather than fundamental shifts in China's pattern. But given that China does shift its pattern every 30 years or so, and that the stresses on China make it reasonable to expect some shift -- and finally, given that there is a trend toward increased tensions in play -- it is not unreasonable to think of China in a different way than has been customary. China has been seen by Americans as a giant money factory. It is that, but it is both less than that and more. It is a great power facing other great powers, and a superpower. And while the scenarios here are extreme, thinking about the extremes can be useful.
Hu was more successful in Saudi Arabia then in the us, and King Abdullah agreed in principle that the Saudis would undertake to fill up the strategic petroleum reserve that China proposed to build on its southern coast, with no less than 100 million tons of crude, equivalent to 700 million barrels - exactly the capacity of the American SPR. The emergency stockpile will be over and above China’s daily needs as the world’s second largest petroleum consumer after the United States, and support its rapid growth rate with an assurance of energy stability.
The project is still in rough outline; its precise location and financing yet to be hammered out. But the Saudi king on April 25, ordered the heads of the Saudi oil industry to go to work with Chinese colleagues on ways, means and figures. This scheme has the power to bind China and Saudi Arabia as strategic allies in the full sense of the word.
The importance the Beijing government’s foreign policy already attaches to the Middle East – and the oil kingdom, in particular – was spelled out in the speech Hu delivered before the Saudi Shura Council, in which he stressed Beijing’s commitment to collaboration and regional stability. The two rulers also drew up a contract for the sale of Chinese defense systems.The items covered were not made public, but the Saudis want advanced ballistic missiles to replace the obsolete Chinese-made CSS2 missiles they bought in the late 1980s.
The Saudi have re-configured their arms purchases to include long-range missiles capable of carrying non-conventional warheads, as part of a deterrent they are planning against a potential Iranian nuclear weapons capability.
The Saudi monarch was keen on reciprocating the warm welcome he received in Beijing. He places great emphasis on a strong Saudi link to Asia hinging on an active Riyadh-Beijing partnership. He is charting this policy partly to outdo the Asian policy launched by Saudi defense minister Crown Prince Sultan, which hinges on strong ties with Japan, Singapore and Pakistan. Sultan’s pro-American Asian orientation was highlighted when he toured the Far East earlier this month. Implementation of the Saudi-Chinese Strategic Petroleum Reserve scheme would give King Abdullah the edge over Sultan.
The Regional Players Today
Europe is much more interested in lifting the Western arms embargo on China than with stopping China's military buildup. Even without lifting the embargo, Europe is providing China with goods and technology that have military applications. In March 2005, Airbus, the subsidized European aircraft conglomerate, announced that it had picked a Chinese partner to manufacture parts for its A-350 aircraft. Announcing the partnership, Airbus China president Laurence Barron commented that China will need about 1,790 commercial aircraft, amounting to a $230 billion market, in the next twenty years.( Xinhua News Service, March 17, 2005.) Such sales only whet Europe's appetite for further profits.
Since the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, the United States and the countries of the European Union have embargoed arms sales to China. In 2005, the EU-Ied by the French and German governments-was about to lift the embargo. President George W. Bush intervened to stop them. At a European summit in February 2005, he warned that such European action could alter the balance of power in the Taiwan Strait. As unremarkable as that was, the reaction from key members of Congress was anything but mundane. It takes a great deal to rouse congressional anger against Europe, but the prospect of the EU lifting the arms embargo did-in spades.
California congressman Tom Lantos, a Democrat, said Congress would "take strong, strong and outraged retaliatory action" if the embargo were lifted, adding that Congress was united against "this degree of arrogant, in-your-face sale to a Communist dictatorship of advanced military equipment." Lantos told the Associated Press, "People who advocate it in Europe should go down to the American military cemeteries and remind themselves of the lives we sacrificed to liberate Europe." (Associated Press, February 24, 2005.)
Senator Richard Lugar, a Republican from Indiana, came out swinging, threatening to cut off American technology-sharing with Europe if the embargo were lifted. Even in the face of this uncharacteristically harsh barrage from Congress, the Europeans didn't give up. On March 31, then German chancellor Gerhard Schroder said he was determined to lift the European arms embargo. (Financial Times.com, March 31, 2005.)
France's foreign minister, Michel Barnier, in what can only be labeled diplomatic doubletalk, pooh-poohed American criticisms of the European plan, saying "warnings and threats" were not "useful" at a time when both sides were trying to repair transatlantic relations. Barniersaid, "Our intention is at no point to multiply the sale of arms in this region. This lifting of the embargo has a political dimension."(Financial Times.com, April 6, 2005.) Not to mention a commercial dimension. The licensed arms sales by Europe to China grew in value from about €54 million in 2001 to at least €416 million in 2003 (which, according to the Financial Times, is the last year for which the full data are available, Ibid.).
By June 2005, the EU had backed down, postponing action on the embargo for perhaps a year. In November 2005, former French prime minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin made it clear that France would gladly sell Taiwan into slavery in exchange for arms sales to China. In a state visit to China, Raffarin "signed or finalized major business deals with Beijing valued at around €3.2 billion" and endorsed China's anti-secession law targeted against Taiwan. He said, "The anti-secession law is completely compatible with the position of France." (Deutsche Welle, November 21, 2005.)
President Bush and congressional leaders have made it clear that America won't tolerate the EU lifting the arms embargo on China. It is very rare in our history-unheard of in at least a decade-for America to throw the gauntlet at Europe's feet in this manner. The president has gotten the Ell's attention, and, according to Defense Department officials involved in the negotiations, has bought at least a year's delay in Europe's plan. If Europe goes ahead regardless, it would be serious. While the Europeans are slashing their own defense budgets, European companies are manufacturing highly sophisticated weapons and electronics systems for export. China can buy most of what it wants from Russia. But Europe has crucial high-tech weapons and electronics that could rapidly transform
China's military. Consider just one system, a little-known Czech electronics system called "Vera-E." According to a report by the Jamestown Foundation, "Beginning in late 2003, the Chinese government started negotiations with a Czech electronics firm, ERA, about the possibility of acquiring the Vera-E passive surveillance system CPSS), an advanced electronic intelligence (ELINT) platform." The report said that "Vera-E would provide the People's Liberation Army (PLA) with a quantum leap in its command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence CC4I) capabilities. The Czech-made Vera-E is a highly advanced sensor that is able to detect aircraft, ships, and ground vehicles from signals emitted by their radar, communications, and other onboard electronic systems. Vera-E is called a 'passive' radar because it emits no signals, and therefore cannot be detected by sensor platforms of opposing forces."
As the Jamestown Foundation report indicates, if Beijing were able to buy Vera-E, Chinese forces would have a decisive advantage against Taiwanese air forces and an almost decisive one against American forces operating in the Taiwan Strait (or elsewhere). As retired Air Force lieutenant general and FOX News Channel senior military analyst Thomas McInerny put it, "I think it would be unconscionable if the Europeans would approve that [sale]. To me, that would help destabilize the region and would hurt our efforts at deterrence in that part of the world."
Ships and aircraft could be tracked and targeted by a sensor aircraft that itself might not be detected or identified as a foe. If Beijing has Vera-E, it could track the U.S. Air Force JSTARS battle-management aircraft easily, making both JSTARS and the forces it directs much more vulnerable to attack by aircraft or ship-borne missiles.
Europeans aren't the only ones who want to sell critical arms to China. There's also Israel. Israeli defense industries make excellent products but have limited markets, and they are completely cut out of the profitable Arab market. But Israel has for years capitalized on arms sales to China and Third World nations. The United States tolerated this, but in 2000 the Clinton administration's permissive attitude toward Israeli arms sales began to diminish.
One of the reasons American air forces dominate the skies is the E-3 Sentry aircraft, also known as "AWACS": airborne early warning and control, The E-3 is an old Boeing 707 on which a massive rotating radome is mounted. AWACS can monitor all aircraft within about two hundred miles and direct both defensive and offensive aircraft in real time. China, desiring this capability, contracted with Israel in 1997 to use its Phalcon radar to create an AWACS-like aircraft on Russian-built Ilyushin-76 Candid aircraft.
Overcoming its earlier ambivalence, the Clinton administration began objecting to the sale, and Israel cancelled the deal with China in September 2000. But that wasn't the end of the problem. At around the same time that it made the deal to sell Phalcon, Israel had apparently agreed to sell China an unknown number of its Harpy unmanned aerial vehicle. Harpies are capable of launching cruise missile-like attacks from long distances. American defense experts were also increasingly worried that the technology used in the now-cancelled U.S.-Israeli Lavi fighter had been sold to China. The dispute came into the open in 2004, when defense undersecretary Douglas Feith demanded the resignation of Israeli general Amos Yaron, who was the director general of Israel's ministry of defense.
America has leverage over Israel that it lacks in Europe. Israel, a usually faithful ally, is dependent on the United States for the advanced weapons it needs to defend itself. One of the two major combat aircraft the U.S. is developing is the F-35 joint strike fighter. The F-35 is the designated replacement for several classes of U.S. fighters and fighter bombers. Many nations, Britain and Israel included, have been eager to participate in its development with an eye toward buying F-35s. America has been eager to have their experts participate, to help build in features that will be dedicated to their particular needs and fighter tactics. In early May 2005, the Department of Defense terminated information sharing with Israel on the F-35, closing it out of the aircraft's development.
"Peaceful coexistence" is a term that had a deep ideological significance to the Soviets before the fall of the Berlin Wall, and it has an equally deep ideological significance to the Chinese now. To the Communists and China is still determinedly Communist-"peaceful coexistence" means the consolidation of the Communist Party's power at home and expansion to subject satellite states without interference from the West. In other words, it is China's label for its Cold War against the West.
The Bush administration understands that fanning the flames of freedom is better than "peaceful coexistence." On his way to Beijing, President Bush stopped in Japan to meet with Japanese prime minister Junichiro Koizumi. In Kyoto, ,the president held up Taiwan as an example for China's future. He said :
By advancing the cause of liberty throughout this region, we will contribute to the prosperity of all-and deliver the peace and stability that can only come with freedom. ... [M]odern Taiwan is free and democratic and prosperous. By embracing freedom at allleveIs, Taiwan has delivered prosperity to its people and created a free and democratic Chinese society .... Other Asian societies have taken some steps toward freedom, but they have not yet completed the journey .... As China reforms its economy, its leaders are finding that once the door to freedom is opened even a crack, it can not be closed. As the people of China grow in prosperity, their demands for political freedom will grow as well. President Hu has explained to me his vision of "peaceful development," and he wants his people to be more prosperous. I have pointed out that the people of China want more freedom to express themselves, to worship without state control, to print Bibles and other sacred texts without fear of punishment. The efforts of Chinese people to improve their society should be welcomed as part of China's development. By meeting the legitimate demands of its citizens for freedom and openness, China's leaders can help their country grow into a modern, prosperous, and confident nation. (President George W. Bush speaking in Kyoto, Japan, on November 16, 2005, on his way to Beijing.)
The Beijing regime was unused to such lectures from America. Even so, they received President Bush warmly. They recognize that the Bush administration understands the nervousness of China's Asian neighbors about Beijing's emergence as a regional ‘Superpower’. Japan, India, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia do not want to become Chinese satellites.
JAPAN
President Bush got a huge gift from Japan on Christmas Eve 2005. Japan is not ignorant of China's military buildup. Early in December 2005, Japanese foreign minister Taro Aso said that China's buildup was a threat to Japan. A Beijing spokesman said that Aso's comments were "highly irresponsible" and questioned his motives. But both Washington and Tokyo weren't diverted by Beijing's bluster. On Christmas Eve, the Koizumi government made an announcement that shook the region:
Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe said Japan had decided to proceed with the United States to jointly develop missile interceptors for a ballistic missile defense of Japan. (Asia Times, December 22, 2005.)
INDIA
The United States and India had no productive relationship during the Clinton years. But as Michael Barone of u.s. News & World Report wrote in July 2005, "You didn't see it in the headlines this week, but it's likely to be more important in the long run than many things that received much more notice. The 'it' in question is the New Framework for the U.5.-India Defense Relationship signed ... by U.S. Defense Secretary
Donald Rumsfeld and Indian Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee. This agreement provides for increased cooperation on research and development of high-tech weaponry and joint and combined training exercises." India's considerable power and influence in the region, if allied with America's, would be an enormous obstacle to Chinese aggression, however India recently joined Russia and China plus Iran in a possible cooperation block.
SINGAPORE, THAILAND, VIETNAM, AND SOUTH KOREA
In 2005, America signed a strategic framework with Singapore. Thailand, an ally during the Vietnam War, now hosts thousands of U.S. airmen, sailors, soldiers, and Marines. Vietnam itself is now engaged in military to-military cooperation with the United States. Even the South Koreans, who have dismissed American advice on dealing with North Korea, are indicating some cooperation with U.S. initiatives because of their fear of China.
During the first Cold War, American governments spoke about "containing" the Soviet Union. American officials don't use the word "containment" now because the Beijing regime finds it offensive. But containment is what we're talking about, and the Bush administration has been more successful at countering Beijing's military, diplomatic, and economic initiatives than any administration since the Korean War.
Aside from containment, the United States has employed "constructive engagement." In 2005, President Bush and Defense Secretary DonaId Rumsfeld made separate visits to China. Peter Rodman, assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, said one lesson learned during Secretary Rumsfeld's China visit was that "you can be firm with the Chinese and frank with the Chinese and yet have a very constructive relation with them." Facts by today (Mai 12, 2006) however are that China now is engaged with about every major terrorist nation, from Sudan to Somalia and from Iran to North Korea.
Conclusion
Investments in military technology and capital systems that might be needed to ensure America's ability to defend its interests against potential Chinese aggression, later on, fall into several general categories:
1) Cyber-war systems: Secure communication and computer networks are essential for the military and intelligence communities to be able to perform their tasks. The Defense Department, the NSA, the CIA, and every other national security-related agency are making protection against cyber-attack a priority. But too little is being done because budgets are tight. The Defense Department and the NSA should coordinate a two-year plan, thoroughly revised and updated every two years, to defend against cyber-attacks, ·and Congress needs to authorize the money to implement it. Congressmen need to put national security ahead of their usual pork-barrel spending. Since September 11, stock markets and other financial institutions have erected firewalls against cyber-attacks and have taken other precautions. Power grids, nuclear power plants, air traffic control systems, and other crucial elements of our electronic infrastructure need similar protection. We also need offensive cyber-war systems and strategies so that we can strike-sometimes preemptively-or counter-strike and defeat enemies who would attack our computer networks.
2) Anti-satellite weapons: China is investing heavily in weapons to destroy military and commercial satellites that provide navigational assistance, intelligence, and secure communications. There is no treaty that prevents the United States from using space-based weapons to protect American satellites-and there is no excuse for not protecting these key assets, Congress needs to authorize the funds to develop and deploy such space-based defensive weapons, and we need offensive weapons to destroy enemy satellites as a matter of deterrence, Military and commercial satellites need to make better use of stealth technology and cyber-war defenses like firewalls.
3) Stealth: Stealth technology gives America a decisive advantage in land and sea warfare, but our fleets of B-2 bombers and F-117 fighter-bombers are aging, and we don't have enough of the stealthy F-22 fighters, now entering the Air Force inventory, to accomplish their mission: air supremacy in any battlespace, Congress needs to dramatically increase the purchase of F-22s and consider the next generation of bomber aircraft, which must renew the advantages the small fleet of B-2s now provides.
4) Submarines: China and Russia are massively expanding their fleets of submarines. Our most advanced submarines are being purchased in very small-too small-numbers. A submarine is an expensive weapon system, but also one of the most effective. Unless we dominate the seas with submarine supremacy, we cannot hope to project power and defend our interests in the Pacific.
5) Tanker aircraft: The average age of U.S. Air Force tankers-which guarantee our ability to project airpower-is over fifty years, and the acquisition of new tankers has been delayed because of a scandal involving an Air Force acquisition executive and Boeing, Unless Congress acts, it will be another decade or more before we get the tankers we need now. And we should make sure the tankers are American-made. We cannot afford to contract the job out to Airbus, the subsidized European aircraft builder that wants the contract and which would then have control of repairs and spare parts. Whichever American company is chosen as the new builder, it should be under a contract that provide~ significant financial penalties for delay and major bonuses for exceeding contractual performance and schedule requirements .
6) But most important are well trained people, and in this case all of them should speak more then one language.
China understands American politics as well as any foreign nation does. The Beijing regime recognizes that American attitudes and policies change with each administration. During the Clinton years, China enjoyed a lackadaisical tolerance from the White House that enabled it to obtain-legally and otherwise-many advanced technologies it could not otherwise have bought. After George W. Bush was inaugurated, China tested the new president's courage and resolve as the Soviets had in the European Cold War.
So on April 1, 2001, less than three months after George W. Bush's first inauguration, the Chinese went aggressive against an unarmed American EP-3 Navy reconnaissance aircraft flying over international waters near China. Chinese air force F-8 jets hunted the EP-3, closed with it, and one-in a very dangerous move-tried to "thump" it (pass so close to its nose that the American aircraft would feel a hard bump and be momentarily destabilized by the jet wash). Chinese pilot Wang Wei miscalculated and collided with the EP-3, forcing the damaged aircraft to make an emergency landing on Hainan Island. Wang Wei's fighter crashed, killing him.
Thus the Chinese followed the old Soviet Cold War incident model to the letter. Having first manufactured the confrontation, they actively turned it into a crisis. Beijing demanded an American apology for the aircraft collision that killed their pilot. George W. Bush refused. The Chinese held the American crew hostage for eleven days, until the president issued a statement of regret about the Chinese pilot's death, though President Bush refused to say the American aircraft was at fault. The incident was a cold-blooded provocation intended to test the mettle of the new president. It could have escalated into war, because, as events showed, China has no fear of America. President Bush's cautious reaction avoided a war, and the incident could have been called a draw but for the fact that America refused, only a short time later, to sell the Taiwanese Aegis missile-defense destroyers.
The Aegis decision was partially reversed. The United States offered Taiwan a large arms package, including diesel-electric submarines. But four years later the Taiwanese still hadn't made up their minds about it. Meanwhile, the dead Chinese pilot, Wang Wei, was honored and revered as a "revolutionary martyr" throughout Communist China. The next American president-whoever he or she is-needs to be decisive, cool, and resolute.
Then the US might accomplish what Sun Tzu wrote about in chapter six of The Art of War. He wrote that an enemy can be manipulated by maneuver:
When I wish to give battle, my enemy, even though protected by high walls and deep moats, cannot help but engage me, for I attack a position he must succor. When I wish to avoid battle I may defend myself simply by drawing a line on the ground; the enemy will be unable to attack me because I divert him from going where he wishes. (The Art of War, 2003, p.97.)The US therefore should continue to improve its cooperation with Asian nations, from Japan to South Korea, from Indochina to Thailand and Malaysia, from India to Afghanistan. China understands soft power as well as any nation. Its Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is an example of how it, with Russia's help, is spreading its influence wherever it sees an opening.
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization is a quasi-alliance between China and Russia on one hand and Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan on the other. (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/int/sco.htm.) Its alleged purpose is to increase stability and disarmament in the region. These nations are the strategic key to Southwest Asia and the Caucasus. Some of them harbor terrorists and some of them-importantly for China-have rich, undeveloped oil resources. Since the organization's founding in 2001, Iran, Pakistan, and India have been granted nonmember participant status.
(http://en. wikipedia.org/wiki/Shanghai_ Cooperation_Organization.) The SCO is not a modern equivalent of the Warsaw Pact, but its clear purpose is to challenge American influence in the region, cast China as the protector of Muslim states, and perhaps prevent American counter-terrorist operations in the area. But we can, if we try, use soft power as well as or better than China. The Asian states have every reason to fear China and to increase their economic and military ties to the United States.
In the 1950s, the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) was formed as a parallel to NATO. Its members-Australia, France, Great Britain, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, and the United States-were drawn together to defend themselves from the Soviet Union and China. A formal mutual defense treaty such as SEATO is probably beyond our reach, but one might be able to achieve SEATO's goals without the formality of a treaty.