The surveying of the Russian population on attitudes towards countries in theformer Soviet Union in 2003 has shown that geopolitical visions exist among ordinary people. Roughly half of Russians want some sort of reunification of the territories of the former Soviet Union and believe that Russia's true borders lie outside of Russia's present borders including Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. One-quarter to one-third of the population believed that Russia should have influence in the internal affairs of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
In that sense the population is divided into two groups, one that sees the territorial integrity of at least part of the former Soviet Union as a goal for the Russian state. The second group does not see the need to reconstitute the past and shuns the idea of a greater Russia.
The first vision is a Western one that sees or desires Russia as a normal state. The second is a Eurasianist vision where Russia is the center of a different rea1m than that of the West--a rea1m in which the West should leave to Russia. There is little indication that there exists a distinction between Moderate and Extreme Eurasianist visions.Because imprecise groups exist each of which holds a different geographic vision of what Russia is or should be.
In any case, the Eurasianist group is identifiable by feelings of fraternity with the former Republics of the Soviet Union and by a desire to have some sort of territorial reunificanon. This vision seems to be associated with respondents who are older, male, attend Church frequently and vote Communist. Older Russians identify with the Soviet times as a period of peace and stability while male's morn the loss of Soviet territory. Religious Russians tend to favor a Eurasianist vision in terms of a Christian rea1m. The vision of religious Russians may also be colored by the mythology surrounding Orthodoxy and the West. To many followers of Russian Orthodoxy, the West long ago turned its back on. things spiritual in favor of consumption and competition. The Christian territory of the former Soviet Union represents a spiritual and morally superior rea1m. What we do not see here is an obvious Nativist or Moderate Eurasianist vision. The absence of any c1ear division between Moderate and Extreme Eurasianism here suggests that these visions may not have clear correlates with socio-demographic status.
The Westemizing vision is identifiable by the rejection of notions of a larger Russia or a Russia who interferes in the affairs of her neighbors. This vision is associated with younger respondents, respondents who are more affluent, more educated, live in one of the capital cities and identify themselves as ethnically Russian. The young, the affluent and the educated number among the 'optimists' of Russia. These are people who can adjust and compete in post-Soviet Russia. Perhaps Russians are moving away from old identities. Russian identity was previously defused by its authority (Tsar or Soviet) then Russians are for the first time free of an identity locked to the existence of a vast multi-national Eurasian state. This new existence both in terms of territory and in terms of position in the world
The three dominant geopolitical visions of contemporary Russia can be classified as 1) Westernizing 2) Moderate Eurasianist 3) Extreme Eurasianist. The Westernizing vision does not see Russia as an expansionist state or one with some sphere of exclusive influence. The two Eurasian visions can be termed 'Slavic' and 'Soviet.'
The Slavic vision seeks reconciliation between the divorced Russo-Slavic states of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. This desire comes from ethnic/cultural linguistic similarities but that these similarities cannot be divorced from a common political and economic context of centuries of integration. This view is a moderate form of Eurasianism in that it does not seek to reincorporate all of the former Soviet Union, but recognizes the special relation of the three states and their special position in the Eurasian landmass that has shaped their histories, cultures and political relations with the rest of the world. . This form of Eurasianism is closest to Nativism.
The Nativist character of this vision is strengthened by the high score of religiosity in the question of protecting Russians abroad. If the Nativist sub-set of Moderate Eurasianism is driving this geopolitical view of a Russia-Ukraine-Belarus union. The Nativist interpretation of the Russian nation is a primordialist one in which Ukrainians, Belarussians and Russians all have the same roots. For others, the Slavic visionary not necessarily be about a broader ethnic nationalism but rather a feeling that Russian high cuiture is the unifying characteristic. This would be more in line with a non-Nativist Eurasianism that sees all peoples of Eurasia as members of the same greater civilization.
The Soviet vision is territorially similar to Extreme Eurasianism. The vision sees all states of the former Soviet Union as part of the Russian realm. This vision rests not solely on cultural characteristics, but on an idea of the Russian state in which it is a great power encompassing a vast empire of Slavic and non-Slavic peoples in Eurasia. Though this vision views ethnic Russians as holding a privileged position within society and sees Russian language and culture as characteristics to be passed on to non-Russian groups, the real lynchpin of the vision is the central authority of the state
Both the Eurasianist visions are expansionist. The Westernizing vision is not. It is interesting then, that those most opposed to. expansion and intervention abroad are not those typically associated with a Westernizing vision of Russia. Rather we see a peripheralized group that is the least enthusiastic about expansion. Those with lower levels of education, older Russians, poorer respondents, non-voters or those who would vote against all and women occupy the lower level of the scale on most of the questions.
The Eurasianist geopolitical view is supported by men, by Communist and LDPR supporters, and by the religious. In general it is opposed by Muscovites and Petersburgians and perhaps by older Russians. And the Eurasianist position may be divided between those who seek total reunification of the Soviet Union and those who only seek a Slavic reunification (Ukraine, Belarus, and possibly Kazakhstan). Furthermore, there may be a divide on foreign policy on the pro-western side between those who wish to fully side with the West on both economic and political/military matters and those who wish economic integration with the West, but while simultaneously pursuing a multipolar world.
The Baltics are seen a gateway region for the young; examples of the path from socialism to Western capitalism and democracy. Younger people feel that they can adapt more to the new ways of life than do older people. There is a group youth in Russia have very negative feelings towards socialism and that have very positive attitudes towards capitalism. In a survey during 2001 one out of four young people e planed to set up their own business in the future. Young people tend to be more apolitical or, at least, less interested in politics than the population at large. This would put them into a Westernizing geopolitical vision by default.
In general Russians with higher incomes do not care that much about those outside of Russia in the former Soviet Union. Perhaps the more affluent feel that Russia is headed in the right direction and no longer yearn for a past where Eurasia was a united whole under the Tsars and Soviets. class division may create two distinct mental geographies of Russia and its near abroad. It is interesting though that this distinction seems clear in the "Culturally Close collection of models as the question has nothing to do with affluence. it may be that feelings of cultural closeness are a surrogate for feelings of fond remembrance for at least some aspects of the Soviet Union. One survey of 2001 has classified Russians into "optimists" and ''pessimists.'' Affluent optimists who no longer feel a cultural fraternity to the former Soviet Union and "pessimists" who do.
Those classified as frequently attending religious services are overwhelmingly Russian . The Russian Empire historically was seen as the protector of Orthodoxy and perhaps those that frequent Orthodox services simply feel more deeply that the territory of Russia is the territory of Tsarist and Soviet times. This belief is reflected in. the significance of RF across models for the states of both the Caucasus and Central Asia. It could also be that those who turn to religion are the "pessimists" who do not feel comfortable in the new world and with the collapse of Communism need some greater meaning in their lives. Thus the geopolitical visions of ordinary Russians can be predicted by certain socio-economic and demographic indicators. A Westernizing vision is held by those who can be classified as 'optimists.' The Westernizers accept the present-day borders of Russia and do not feel that Russia must exercise any sort of suzerainty over the former Soviet Union or Eastern Europe. This group is young, urban, educated and affluent. The countries of the former Soviet Union have little emotional or practical purloin to this group.
Russian men tend to support Nationalist parties and ideologies more so than women There is no such obvious hypothesis for male as a positive indicator in Armenia and Georgia however. The increased likelihood of feelings of cultural closeness of men for these regions may be related to conflict in the Caucasus. With mandatory military service and a war going on in Muslim Chechnya, the non-Muslim states of Armenia and Georgia-situated as islands in a Muslim sea around them may gain special significance. Historically, Russia has seen herself as the protector of Christianity in this region, a fact that may not be lost on those(men) who may have to actually do the protecting.
It may be easy to impose a dualistic script on the Caucasus where regions are either Muslim (not like us) or Christian (like us). Men view the United State's 'war on terrorism more favorably than do women. This may be indicative of a dualistic vision of friend and foe but such an assertion is speculative at best. The connection between gender , attitudes towards Muslims and its impact on perceptions of regions is something that is worth investigating in the future.
In the hierarchy of world cities, Moscow acts as the hub of the former Soviet Union. Linkages of trade, finance, politics and culture flow through Moscow, and to a lesser extent St. Petersburg are more linked to other places in the former Soviet Union than are other places in Russia. With people from the Ukraine and Belarus more likely to travel to Moscow than other parts of Russia. These linkages are strengthened by history. Unlike other former republics, Ukraine and Belarus were never truly "outside" areas conquered by a foreign Russian state. Rather, they were always part of the Russian realm. As recently seen with the elections in the Ukraine, these linkages perhaps have created an emotive geography. While with far off places like Tadjikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Moldova, the primary flows may be to Moscow, these flows of trade, culture, and politics are small from Moscow's accounting. Residents of Moscow and St. Petersburg simply may never encounter these flows and feel as if these are distant regions with little in common with life in Moscow or St. Petersburg.Kazakhstan and Kirgizia are sometimes confused with one another by some of the young Russians. Kazakhstan and Kirgizia are not in this group, however. Additionally, Moldavia appears to be a case onto itself, and simply does not register as important on many Russian’s mental map.
What is noteworthy about the Baltic states is that they continue to stand out as a group. They appear to be thought well of by the young-those who are less likely to think in terms of Soviet territoriality. In terms of regional groupings it is clear that the Baltic countries remain a distinct group that is associated with those thought to be more Westernizing and that the Caucasus and Central Asian countries seem to be favored by those with a more imperial geo-vision.
Within the borders of the former Soviet Union. The religious believe. that Russia's borders extend into the FSU and should try to reach them. There is no indication however, that Eastem Europe is a concern for the religious which suggests that this group has a vision that is contained to the former Soviet Union. Communists seem to believe that Russia should have a military option of protecting Russians abroad, that Russia's borders extend into the former Soviet Union, that Russia should have. influence in Eastem Europe and the former Soviet Union, and that Putin has handled the lraq situation poorly. This is clearly not a vision of Westernizing Nationalism. Rather, Communist Party supporters seem to share a Eurasianist view.
Also, the residents of Moscow or St. Petersburg are less likely to approve of the use of the Russian military to protect Russians abroad. Residents of the capital cities are more cosmopolitan and liberal than those in the regions and therefore this result is expected. Muscovites and Petersburgians are more likely to support Russia trying to actively reach her true borders. However, this conclusion does not seem to go well with the standard view of Moscow and St. Petersburg as relatively cosmopolitan and liberal places. Older Russians identify with the Soviet times as a period of peace and stability while male's morn the loss of Soviet territory. Religious Russians tend to favor a Eurasianist vision in terms of a Christian rea1m. The vision of religious Russians mayaIso be colored by the mythology surrounding Orthodoxy and the West. To many followers of Russian Orthodoxy, the West long ago turned its back on. things spiritual in favor of consumption and competition .
The Christian territory of the former Soviet Union represents a spiritual and morally superior rea1m. What we do not see here is an obvious Nativist or Moderate Eurasianist vision. This is surprising given that in Chapters terms of territory, these visions seem to exist in the population. The absence of any c1ear division between Moderate and Extreme Eurasianism suggests that these visions may not have clear correlates with socio-demographic status.
A Westemizing vision is also present. It is identifiable by the rejection of notions of a larger Russia or a Russia who interferes in the affairs of her neighbors. This vision is associated with younger Russians who are more affluent, more educated, live in one of the capital cities and identify themselves as ethnically Russian. The young, the affluent and the educated number among the 'optimists' of Russia. These are people who can adjust and compete in post-Soviet Russia. Russian ethnicity seems to favor the Westernizing vision, or at least rejects more the Eurasianist vision of the past. Maybe Russian identity was previously defined by its authority (Tsar or Soviet) and now Russians are for the first time free of an identity locked to the existence of a vast multi-national Eurasian state. This new existence both in terms of territory and in terms of position in the world system may be allowing Russia to go through a "Renewal Nationalism" where Russians identify themselves separately and distinctly from the other large ethnic groups of the Soviet Union or Russian Empire.
Thus since the mid-1990' s feelings of xenophobia have risen in Russia. The states of the former Soviet Union may now be "the Other" for most Russians rather than compatriots in a larger Eurasian realm. A simpler analysis however would be that And though Russia is still arguably a "vast multi-national Eurasian state," ethnic Russians now make up an overwhelming majority of the citizens of Russia. Russians still derive their identity from the state and its authority. Now that the state is smaller Russians may have simply recalibrated their identities to that smaller state.
However it is clear that the arena of competition between geopolitical ideologies, scripts and traditions exists not only in the halls of government and institutions of foreign policy; not only in the editorial pages of newspapers or the images on the nightly news; but exists within the minds of the public. In democracies, foreign policy must meet public approval. The division in the Russian public between Westernisrs and Eurasianists however is likely to influence foreign policy in Russia for years to come.The nature of geopolitical visions in Russia is both practical and emotional/psychological. At a hypothetical level,. the majority of Russians desire a reconstitution of the Soviet Union; every country of the former Soviet Union is favored for reunification by over half of the survey respondents. However, the 'practical geopolitics' of Russians reveal important schisms in society.
Only 45% of those surveyed in 2003 accepted that Russia's borders are her 'true' ones and 37% of Russians would like Russia to pursue these borders by some means. However, this realpolitik is but an emotive one as weIl. When queried about specific costs (such as the use of military force) the emotive dreams give way to practical reality. For Russian elites (or Western propagandists) geopolitical scripts that rely on emotive responses to gain the support of Russians for foreign policy actions may prove to be inadequate.
Moreover, those with the least problems domestica1ly (the affluent, urban, young and well educated-who can perhaps afford to care about foreign policy at the expense of domestic policy-are the ones least likely to support territorial aspirations in the near abroad. Geopolities for regular people may be a 'vanity issue' in that territorial and foreign policy goals are only important when no major economic issues exist at the scale of the household. This link between the economic reality of the household (or perhaps locality) and how people react to geopolitical scripts and form their own geopolitical visions has gone unexplored.
It is hard to imagine that the geopolitical culture of a state could remain static as it moved from a position of lesser to a position of greater prosperity. As a state's position in the world-system changes, so does the position of individual households and localities. We know for instance, that Russians do not feel great pride in Russia relative to levels of pride in country found in Europe or the United States. A poll conducted in February, 2002 showed that given the choice between pride and shame, 39% of Russians felt shame about Russia and only 26% felt pride. If Russia prospers it is logical to assume that levels of pride will increase.
The collective interpretations by Russians of Russia's place in the world system are likely to shape the geopolitical consciousness of Russia as it continues to move through the market transition and find its place in the world economy. Turning back now to Eurasianism; it is important to note that this paradigm does not represent one single view. It was theorized here that two types of Eurasianism would be identifiable; Moderate Eurasianism and Extreme Eurasianism. Two differing, broad Eurasianist visions were found in terms of territorial preference. There is certainly a greater value placed on . Ukraine and Belarus (Moderate Eurasianism) than on the rest ofthe former Soviet Union (Extreme Eurasianism). By some measures (economic and political ties) Kazakhstanwould be part of this group.
Ukraine, Belarus and to a lesser extent Northern Kazakhstan have a long and special geographical, cultural and historical role in Russian history. They form the core economic and population core of what once was the Russian Empire and Soviet Union. It is therefore unclear whether or not the basis of this 'Slavic' vision is cultural, economic or historical. Likely it is all three of these few Russians would consider Ukraine or Belarus important on only one of these levels. The fact that a group attached to this particular vision could not be. delineated raises some important ideas and questions.
Firstly, is the value placed on Ukraine and Belarus may be near universal in Russia? If so, Ukraine and Belarus would rise to the top of preference measures (cultural closeness, reunification, political and economic ties) and stand out as a group but makes it impossible to isolate a portion of the population that a 'Slavic' vision can be identified with.
A second possibility for why a particular group could not be attached to the 'Slavic' vision is that there was insufficient data. We know, for instance, that southern Russia is more conservative and traditional relative to a more radical north. It would be interesting to probe the regional differences as they relate to geopolitical visions. The possibility of a Nativist vision might be regionally concentrated in the southern oblasts in Russia. This is due to the central idea of 'sobomost' in Eurasianism. This is the idea that Russians have always been a communal people dating to an agricultural past centered on village life. It evokes spiritual. mid ethical feelings of the community as the most important element of society (as opposed to the individual).
The Nativist view of the Russian nation is primordialist. A primordialist understanding of national identity involves connecting people to territory in an organic sense. The nation has always existed on the land and is part of its natural lands within the horders of the former Soviet Union. The religious believe that Russia's borders extend into the Former Soviet Union and should try to reach them. There is no indication however, that Eastem Europe is a concern for the religious which suggests that this group has avision that is contained to the former Soviet Union. Communists seem to believe that Russia should brave a military option of protecting Russians abroad, that Russia's borders extend into the former Soviet Union, that Russia should have. influence in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, and that Putin has handled the lraq situation poorly. Communist Party supporters seem to share a Eurasianist view that sees a Russian rea1m that extends not only into the former Soviet Union, but into Eastern Europe.
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