







Already around the year 500 AD of the European calender, the Persians, Arabs, Africans, Javanese, Jews, Indians and Chinese created and maintained a ‘global economy’. Whereby ‘the East’ enabled the rise of the West through two main processes: diffusionism/assimilationism and appropriationism. Note that I use the term 'Middle East' rather than 'West Asia' only because the former term is more recognizable to the general reader.
First, the Easterners created a global economy and global communications network after 500 along which the more advanced Eastern 'resource portfolios' (e.g. Eastern ideas, institutions and technologies) diffused across to the West, where they were subsequently assimilated, through what I call oriental globalisation. And second, Western imperialism after 1492 led the Europeans to appropriate all manner of Eastern economic resources to enable the rise of the West. In short, the West did not autonomously pioneer its own development in the absence of Eastern help. And finally the European ‘Globalization’ discourse completed by the 1930’s, in fact emerged during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
Thus the Italian merchant communes can equally be seen as derivative of the wider innovative developments pioneered in the Eastern-led global economy. And the European Renaissance and scientific revolution considered from the perspective of the Islamic Middle East and North Africa instead of Tuscany.
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The Myth of The Industrial Revolution (Historical Truth in the Age of Globalization, P.3) |
What the East Thought the West (Historical Truth in the Age of Globalization, P.4) |
Colonialism and Industrialisation: History's Revenge in the Age of Globalization
The greatest legacy of the Portuguese, Dutch, and English, seaborne 'empire' as we have seen above thus was not how much but how little things changed in terms of Asia's dominance of the global economy between 1500 and 1750/1800. The conclusion is hard to avoid: the 'European age' or the 'Vasco da Gama epoch of Asia' turns out to be but retrospective Eurocentric wishful thinking. In fact South and S.East Asia, Japan, China as well as the Ottoman and Persian empires were economically and politically strong enough to resist the European incursion, at least until about 1800.
In fact la chinoiserie, from porcelain and silks to politics and philosophy, was very much in vogue in mid-eighteenth-century France. The notion that political and social systems could be improved by imitating the Chinese was shared by renowned European philosophes from Leibnitz to Voltaire. .(See J. Baruzzi, Leibnitz et l'organisation de la terre, Paris, 1909.) They believed that China might help ruling elites to solve the most perplexing political puzzle of the century - how to introduce Enlightenment ideas without disturbing the political and social foundations of absolutist regimes. The best supporting evidence for this, of course, is to be found in Mtontesquieu's Esprit des lois, Us. 8 and 9.
From the late 19th to the mid-20th century, most migratory flows originated in Europe and Asia and were destined for core countries. But since the end of World War II and the decline of the European colonial empires, new regions have become the target of migratory flows. Current figures show that although many migrants are still moving to core regions, not all are. There are also major patterns of migration within Southeast Asia, the Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America. Thus, at the same time that there are global flows of migrants, there are also significant regional flows.
History of Globalization: In and out of India P.1: The First Trade-Wars. ![]()
History of Globalization: In and out of India P.2: The First Multinational Companies.