The demand for an "apology" has become commonplace in Chinese diplomacy. Thus for Chinese leaders, the biggest block to improved Sino-Japanese relations is Japanese reluctance to offer a formal apology to China for World War II atrocities.

Apology also became a sticking point in negotiations between China and the U.S. in 1999 subsequent to the NATO bombing ofthe P.R.C. Embassy in Belgrade and in April 2001 in the wake of the military aircraft collision. Why were apologies so important to China? How do we understand China's "apology diplomacy"?

According to the Realist model referred to  in p. 1, the Sino-American conflict is a clash of national interests, and is caused by a struggle for power. Some scholars believe the Post-Cold War US China relationship represents a pattern of "superpower/great power competition"-a competition between an established superpower and a rising great power. See also Peter Brookes, "Strategic Realism: The Future of U.S.-Sino Security Relations," Strategic Review, Summer 1999: 53-56.)

When a nation that has become economically and militarily dominant on a global scale is confronted by a rapidly developing regional power with its own imperative needs for identity, dignity, and independence, history shows that the resulting conflict can easily escalate out of control, creates the risk of  a "hegemonic war.” For a realist critic, China's demand for an "apology" could be merely a "test-of wills" power-play on China's part using the issue of apology. For example, Bernstein and Ross argue that Sino-US rivalry occurs due to Chinese desires to dominate Asia and by the US long-standing policy of preventing a single country from dominating that region. (Coming Conflict with China, 1997).

Apology or not is a contest over maintaining (for the U.S.) or (re)claiming (for China) relative power in the region. As Avruch and Wang asked: "Why apology? The realist might say, in a clash of wills any issue will serve: why not apology?” (p. 345.)

The realist position is certainly plausible in some aspects. In both countries, there were nationalists who did take the apology as test-of-wills. For example, President Clinton was strongly criticized by some U.S. media for "kowtowing" to China when he apologized five times for the embassy bombing. Even Henry Kissinger asked him to "stop apologizing.” (Kissinger: 'Chinese Behavior is Excessive and Really Unacceptable: CNN, May 11, 1999, and "How Low Would He Bow?" Newsweek International, June 28, 1999)

In 2001, a Weekly Standard article called President Bush's offer of two "very sorry" to China over the EP-3 incident the "profound national humiliation" of the United States. (See "National Humiliation," Weekly Standard, April 9, 2001.)

Though focusing on different questions and using different approaches of research, scholars who conducted research on the EP-3 Crisis agreed with each other on one point.

Chinese and American leaders initially confronted a diplomatic impasse because their minimally acceptable positions did not overlap. Faced with strong domestic constraints, they reached a compromise in large part by jointly lowering their initial demands in ways that deflected the criticisms of their respective domestic hard-liners. The article by Avruch and Wang demonstrates how the two governments used their linguistic difference to write their respective "official" translations of final texts in ways that allowed both sides to please their domestic audiences as we have seen. However, if it is merely a "test-of-wills" power-play, why did the two governments cooperate with each other to play act? Why did the feelings of the domestic audiences prevail over the national interest of test-of-wills?

If an "apology" was merely a "test-of-wills" power-play for the United States, why did President Clinton apologize five times for the embassy bombing? And why did President Bush keep silent when China translated the two "very sorry’s" as formal apologies? For the embassy bombing case, any country that made such a tragic mistake should apologize, and Clinton did. It was a nonnal international practice, not a test of will. If China's demand for an "apology" was merely a "test-of-wills" power-play on China's part using the issue of apology, why didn't China accept Clinton's first apology? For the EP-3 case, initial Chinese demands included that the U.S. halt all surveillance flights. In a national interest calculation, this demand should be more important than an apology, but why did an American apology become the sole demand of the Chinese in the negotiation?

But why didn't China ask the Philippines, Vietnam or Indonesia to apologize for the injuries and deaths of the Chinese people during the disputes with these countries over the South China Sea territory disputes? Why were apologies from the U.S. so important to the Chinese government?

The leadership of the CCP however often uses the content of history and memory to specify the membership, the role identity, and the myth and legitimacy and of the ruling party. As the Party proudly announces: "We have abrogated the unequal treaties imposed upon China by Western powers and all the privileges of imperialism in the country;" "We have thoroughly ended the history of humiliating diplomacy in modern China and effectively safeguarded state sovereignty, security and national dignity." For this ruling party, its responsibility and leadership role have been entrusted by the history of the past century-the Party claims it has made the biggest sacrifices and contribution in the struggle of "putting an end to the past humiliation."

This historical contribution has constituted the basis of the group's myth and self esteem, and more importantly, its legitimacy for ruling China. Because of this, for the communist rulers, some nonmaterial interests that have been defined by the content of history and memory, such as national dignity and face, and respect from other countries, become equally important or even more important than some material interests.

For Americans, the 1999 embassy bombing was a technical mistake, and the 2001 plane collision happened outside Chinese territorial waters, therefore, they would not think that these incidents were intentional or there was any kind of bullying or aggression to China. However, as discussed, the majority of Chinese people, including the majority members of the Politburo, believed that the embassy bombing was a deliberate action, an American conspiracy. For the EP-3 Incident, although the EP-3 was outside Chinese territorial waters still it was conducting spying against China, and the collision caused the damage of a Chinese jet and the death of a Chinese pilot.

Therefore, they saw both incidents as American aggression; many of them even took them as China's new humiliation, another in a long line of humiliations that China has suffered since the Opium War.

Given the fact that the central myth and the legitimacy of the ruling party came from its historical "sacrifices and contribution"-"putting an end of the history of humiliating diplomacy in modern China.” And therefore, the legitimacy of current China's rulers is highly dependent upon successful performance on the international stage. The Chinese political elite is ,responsible for maintaining China's "national mianzi (face)" in its dealings with other nations. When the incident was perceived as bullying and humiliation, and when the central myth and the legitimacy of the government are highly dependent upon maintaining China's "national face," it became natural and understandable that the government needed to be 'tough." However, since both military retaliation and economic reparation were not realistic policy choices for China in both incidents, the demand for a public apology from the United States thus became a "right," if not only, choice for Beijing. To Beijing, each of the two incidents was much more than simple violation of Chinese sovereignty: each was seen as a test for the Party-not a test-of-will-but a test of the ruling party's legitimacy and "political credibility." The Chinese government needed to be able to show the people, the public, that it had successfully obtained some kind of "victory" over the United States. And if the government could not get that, leaders would feel that they will appear weak in the eyes of the public. (See also Albert Yee, Semantic Ambiguity and Joint Deflections in the Hainan Negotiations. China: An International Journal, 2004, 2, 1 :53-82.)

For the embassy bombing incident, popular nationalists had taken to the streets in protest, and Chinese diplomats were "forced" to take a public posture of rejecting American apologies and explanations. When President Clinton used the hot-line between Beijing and Washington which was set up after the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis as a confidence building measure to call President Jiang, Jiang refused to talk with Clinton.

Peter Hays Gries commented on the Chinese behavior:
Like a father refusing his son's repeated prostrations of forgiveness, rejecting America's repeated apologies was one of the few ways China's leadership could seek to restore Chinese self-esteem in the eyes of the Chinese people. (Gries, "Social Psychology and the identity-Conflict Debate: ls a 'China Threat' Inevitable?" European Journal 01 International Relations, 2005 11: 235-265.)

Compared with the embassy bombing incident, the EP-3 case is a minor incident. It became a diplomatic crisis because China demanded a public apology and the Bush administration refused to offer one. And so what needed to happen was an arrangement in which the Bush administration could claim to American public that it did not make a full apology, while the Chinese leadership could explain to their public that they did extract some concessions from the United States and win some sort of apology. Using a very creative solution of "one word, two translations," the two governments cooperated with each other.

The EP-3 incident happened on April 1, 2001. Chinese President Jiang Zemin left Beijing on April 4 to conduct a scheduled visit to five Latin American countries. Many people had thought that he would postpone this visit due to the crisis. He even was in a poetic mood during the trip and wrote a poem to present to his Cuban counterpart Fidel Castro before departing from Cuba. The poem was written in Chinese calligraphy on a large page of folded paper and given to Castro on April 13.91; In the bright dawn cloud l left China Ten thousand kilometers to Latin America Only takes ten days And I heard The fierce wind and the storm from the opposite shore The pine trees Stand still, With the pride and strength of the mountain. (Xinghua News Agency, translated by Zheng Wang.)

Written just one day after the end of the standoff, what Jiang wanted to say in this poem is clear. In Chinese language, the pine is a common metaphor - used for steadfast revolutionaries and great leaders who are never afraid of foreign pressures. The poem can also be interpreted this way: For Jiang, the crisis is a "test" (The fierce wind and the storm from the opposite shore) of China's and his own pride, strength, honor and courage.

As Jiang bints in this poem, he is the winner of the "test" (The pine trees, stand still), he has saved "face" and won "pride" (With the pride and strength of the mountain). The collision between the Chinese fighter plane and the D.S. spy plane has developed somehow into an unexpected clash of "face" and pride; For Beijing, a form of apology from Bush, above all, is a gesture of abasement that gives the recipient "face."

A People's Daily article of May 19 particularly praised President's Jiang's "staunch and mature leadership" during the embassy bombing incident. "The leadership of the Party with comrade Jiang Zemin at the core has demonstrated its courage and ability to control complicated internal and international situations, and to handle major breaking events.” ( People's Daily, May 19, 1999, Page 1.)

Anyone familiar with Chinese official foreign policy statements will undoubtedly recognize the moralizing tone that pervades such pronouncements. It is a constant in P.R.C. foreign policy. Although most nations provide moral justification for their foreign policies, the pervasive and patronizing nature of P .R.C. ethical rationalizations is striking.  Kenneth Lieberthal calls this "petulant moralism." According to him, when dealing with western countries, Chinese people have a complex of "you owe us." We have been bullied and humiliated by industrial powers for the last 150 years. You owe us a lot. We are right, and you need to recognize the moral correctness of our stance - and then we can talk about specifics. (Interview by Rose Brady. Business Week Online, August 4, 2003.)

When the Chinese have the moral high ground, they can be unrelenting in exploiting the situation. It goes back to the Confucian tradition, in which the ruler is morally superior, and therefore when your opponent apologizes it proves they are morally inferior and cannot be the legitimate ruler." (Fox ButterfieId, "China's Demand for Apology Is Rooted in Tradition," New York Times, April 7, 2001.)

Also the spy plane incident thus fed into a long-held Chinese sense of victimization, of having been the world's greatest nation, only to be humiliated in the 19th and early 20th centuries. The American spy plane touched on sensitive Chinese feelings about Western imperialist nations taking advantage of a weakened China in the 19th and early 20th centuries. For the same reason, as we discussed in the previous section of this chapter, most Chinese understood the Belgrade bombing as yet another in a long history of Western insults.

The demand for an "apology" has become commonplace in Chinese diplomacy. For Chinese leaders, the biggest block to improved Sino-Japanese relations is Japanese reluctance to offer a formal apology to China for World War II atrocities. Apology also became a sticking point in negotiations between China and the U.S. in 1999 subsequent to the NATO bombing ofthe P.R.C. Embassy in Belgrade and in April 2001 in the wake of the military aircraft collision. Why were apologies so important to China? How do we understand China's "apology diplomacy"?

According to the Realist model referred to  in p. 1, the Sino-American conflict is a clash of national interests, and is caused by a struggle for power. Some scholars believe the Post-Cold War US China relationship represents a pattern of "superpower/great power competition"-a competition between an established superpower and a rising great power. (See also Peter Brookes, "Strategic Realism: The Future of U.S.-Sino Security Relations," Strategic Review, Summer 1999: 53-56.)

When a nation that has become economically and militarily dominant on a global scale is confronted by a rapidly developing regional power with its own imperative needs for identity, dignity, and independence, history shows that the resulting conflict can easily escalate out of control, creates the risk of  a "hegemonic war.” For a realist critic, China's demand for an "apology" could be merely a "test-of wills" power-play on China's part using the issue of apology. For example, Bernstein and Ross argue that Sino-US rivalry occurs due to Chinese desires to dominate Asia and by the US long-standing policy of preventing a single country from dominating that region. (Coming Conflict with China, 1997).

Apology or not is a contest over maintaining (for the U.S.) or (re)claiming (for China) relative power in the region. As Avruch and Wang asked: "Why apology? The realist might say, in a clash of wills any issue will serve: why not apology?” (p. 345.)

The realist position is certainly plausible in some aspects. In both countries, there were nationalists who did take the apology as test-of-wills. For example, President Clinton was strongly criticized by some U.S. media for "kowtowing" to China when he apologized five times for the embassy bombing. Even Henry Kissinger asked him to "stop apologizing.” (Kissinger: 'Chinese Behavior is Excessive and Really Unacceptable: CNN, May 11, 1999, and "How Low Would He Bow?" Newsweek International, June 28, 1999)

In 2001, a Weekly Standard article called President Bush's offer of two "very sorry" to China over the EP-3 incident the "profound national humiliation" of the United States. (See "National Humiliation," Weekly Standard, April 9, 2001.)

Though focusing on different questions and using different approaches of research, scholars who conducted research on the EP-3 Crisis agreed with each other on one point.

Chinese and American leaders initially confronted a diplomatic impasse because their minimally acceptable positions did not overlap. Faced with strong domestic constraints, they reached a compromise in large part by jointly lowering their initial demands in ways that deflected the criticisms of their respective domestic hard-liners. The article by Avruch and Wang demonstrates how the two governments used their linguistic difference to write their respective "official" translations of final texts in ways that allowed both sides to please their domestic audiences as we have seen. However, if it is merely a "test-of-wills" power-play, why did the two governments cooperate with each other to play act? Why did the feelings of the domestic audiences prevail over the national interest of test-of-wills?

If an "apology" was merely a "test-of-wills" power-play for the United States, why did President Clinton apologize five times for the embassy bombing? And why did President Bush keep silent when China translated the two "very sorry’s" as formal apologies? For the embassy bombing case, any country that made such a tragic mistake should apologize, and Clinton did. It was a nonnal international practice, not a test of will.

If China's demand for an "apology" was merely a "test-of-wills" power-play on China's part using the issue of apology, why didn't China accept Clinton's first apology? For the EP-3 case, initial Chinese demands included that the V.S. halt all surveillance flights. In a national interest calculation, this demand should be more important than an apology, but why did an American apology become the sole demand of the Chinese in the negotiation?

Why didn't China ask the Philippines, Vietnam or Indonesia to apologize for the injuries and deaths of the Chinese people during the disputes with these countries over the South China Sea territory disputes? Why were apologies from the U.S. so important to the Chinese government?

The leadership of the CCP however often uses the content of history and memory to specify the membership, the role identity, and the myth and legitimacy and of the ruling party. As the Party proudly announces: "We have abrogated the unequal treaties imposed upon China by Western powers and all the privileges of imperialism in the country;" "We have thoroughly ended the history of humiliating diplomacy in modern China and effectively safeguarded state sovereignty, security and national dignity." For this ruling party, its responsibility and leadership role have been entrusted by the history of the past century-the Party claims it has made the biggest sacrifices and contribution in the struggle of "putting an end to the past humiliation."

This historical contribution has constituted the basis of the group's myth and self esteem, and more importantly, its legitimacy for ruling China. Because of this, for the communist rulers, some nonmaterial interests that have been defined by the content of history and memory, such as national dignity and face, and respect from other countries, become equally important or even more important than some material interests.

For Americans, the 1999 embassy bombing was a technical mistake, and the 2001 plane collision happened outside Chinese territorial waters, therefore, they would not think that these incidents were intentional or there was any kind of bullying or aggression to China. However, as discussed, the majority of Chinese people, including the majority members of the Politburo, believed that the embassy bombing was a deliberate action, an American conspiracy. For the EP-3 Incident, although the EP-3 was outside Chinese territorial waters still it was conducting spying against China, and the collision caused the damage of a Chinese jet and the death of a Chinese pilot.

Therefore, they saw both incidents as American aggression; many of them even took them as China's new humiliation, another in a long line of humiliations that China has suffered since the Opium War.

Given the fact that the central myth and the legitimacy of the ruling party came from its historical "sacrifices and contribution"-"putting an end of the history of humiliating diplomacy in modem China.” And therefore, the legitimacy of current China's rulers is highly dependent upon successful performance on the international stage. The Chinese political elite is ,responsible for maintaining China's "national mianzi (face)" in its dealings with other nations. When the incident was perceived as bullying and humiliation, and when the central myth and the legitimacy of the government are highly dependent upon maintaining China's "national face," it became natural and understandable that the government needed to be 'tough." However, since both military retaliation and economic reparation were not realistic policy choices for China in both incidents, the demand for a public apology from the United States thus became a "right," if not only, choice for Beijing. To Beijing, each of the two incidents was much more than simple violation of Chinese sovereignty: each was seen as a test for the Party-not a test-of-will-but a test of the ruling party's legitimacy and "political credibility." The Chinese government needed to be able to show the people, the public, that it had successfully obtained some kind of "victory" over the United States. And if the government could not get that, leaders would feel that they will appear weak in the eyes of the public. (See also Albert Yee, Semantic Ambiguity and Joint Deflections in the Hainan Negotiations. China: An International Journal, 2004, 2, 1 :53-82.)

For the embassy bombing incident, popular nationalists had taken to the streets in protest, and Chinese diplomats were "forced" to take a public posture of rejecting American apologies and explanations. When President Clinton used the hot-line between Beijing and Washington which was set up after the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis as a confidence building measure to call President Jiang, Jiang refused to talk with Clinton.

Peter Hays Gries commented on the Chinese behavior:
Like a father refusing his son's repeated prostrations of forgiveness, rejecting America's repeated apologies was one of the few ways China's leadership could seek to restore Chinese self-esteem in the eyes of the Chinese people. (Gries, "Social Psychology and the identity-Conflict Debate: ls a 'China Threat' Inevitable?" European Journal 01 International Relations, 2005 11: 235-265.)

Compared with the embassy bombing incident, the EP-3 case is a minor incident. It became a diplomatic crisis because China demanded a public apology and the Bush administration refused to offer one. And so what needed to happen was an arrangement in which the Bush administration could claim to American public that it did not make a full apology, while the Chinese leadership could explain to their public that they did extract some concessions from the United States and win some sort of apology. Using a very creative solution of "one word, two translations," the two governments cooperated with each other.
The EP-3 incident happened on April 1, 2001. Chinese President Jiang Zemin left Beijing on April 4 to conduct a scheduled visit to five Latin American countries. Many people had thought that he would postpone this visit due to the crisis. He even was in a poetic mood during the trip and wrote a poem to present to his Cuban counterpart Fidel Castro before departing from Cuba. The poem was written in Chinese calligraphy on a large page of folded paper and given to Castro on April 13.91:

In the bright dawn cloud l left China
Ten thousand kilometers to Latin America Only takes ten days
And I heard The jierce wind and the storm from the opposite shore
The pine trees Stand still,
With the pride and strength of the mountain. (Xinghua News Agency, translated by Zheng Wang.)

Written just one day after the end of the standoff, what Jiang wanted to say in this poem is clear. In Chinese language, the pine is a common metaphor - used for steadfast revolutionaries and great leaders who are never afraid of foreign pressures. The poem can also be interpreted this way: For Jiang, the crisis is a "test" (The fierce wind and the storm from the opposite shore) of China's and his own pride, strength, honor and courage.

As Jiang bints in this poem, he is the winner of the "test" (The pine trees, stand still), he has saved "face" and won "pride" (With the pride and strength of the mountain). The collision between the Chinese fighter plane and the D.S. spy plane has developed somehow into an unexpected clash of "face" and pride; For Beijing, a form of apology from Bush, above all, is a gesture of abasement that gives the recipient "face."

A People's Daily article of May 19 particularly praised President's Jiang's "staunch and mature leadership" during the embassy bombing incident. "The leadership of the Party with comrade Jiang Zemin at the core has demonstrated its courage and ability to control complicated internal and international situations, and to handle major breaking events.” (People's Daily, May 19, 1999, Page 1.)

Anyone familiar with Chinese official foreign policy statements will undoubtedly recognize the moralizing tone that pervades such pronouncements. It is a constant in P.R.C. foreign policy. Although most nations provide moral justification for their foreign policies, the pervasive and patronizing nature of P .R.C. ethical rationalizations is striking.  Kenneth Lieberthal calls this "petulant moralism." According to him, when dealing with western countries, Chinese people have a complex of "you owe us." We have been bullied and humiliated by industrial powers for the last 150 years. You owe us a lot. We are right, and you need to recognize the moral correctness of our stance - and then we can talk about specifics. (Interview by Rose Brady. Business Week Online, August 4, 2003.)

When the Chinese have the moral high ground, they can be unrelenting in exploiting the situation. It goes back to the Confucian tradition, in which the ruler is morally superior, and therefore when your opponent apologizes it proves they are morally inferior and cannot be the legitimate ruler." (Fox ButterfieId, "China's Demand for Apology Is Rooted in Tradition," New York Times, April 7, 2001.)

Even the spy plane incident (appart from the fact it also wanted to test new President Bush's resolve) fed into a long-held Chinese sense of victimization, of having been the world's greatest nation, only to be humiliated in the 19th and early 20th centuries. The American spy plane touched on sensitive Chinese feelings about Western imperialist nations taking advantage of a weakened China in the 19th and early 20th centuries. For the same reason, as we discussed in the previous section of this chapter, most Chinese understood the Belgrade bombing as yet another in a long history of Western insults.
 

Why Chinese Enmity towards the USA? P.1: Six Questions, more Answers

Sinocentric Historiography Research P.2: It's a Conspiracy Theory