When scholars from different disciplines have conducted intense research the past ten years to analyze how history and memory issues reflect larger contexts and structures. As a result they found that many of today's conflicts have actually been generated by issues of history and memory. (Anthony D. Smith in Chosen Peoples, 2003).

Also many others came to a similar conclusion, for example Ian McBride, ed. History and Memory in Modern Ireland, Cambridge University Press (2001), concluded that " the interpretation of the past has always been at the heart of national conflict.” Also Victor Roudometof, in  Collective Memory, National ldentity, and Ethnic Conflict: Greece, Bulgaria and the Macedonian Question ( 2002) considers that "the conflicting ethnocentric national narratives of the different sides have generated the Greek Bulgarian-Macedonian dispute of 1990’s.” The same with Gerrit W. Gong, ed. Memory and History in East and Southeast Asia, Washington, D.C.( 2001), “past conflicts have come to shape international relations in East Asia.”

According the above and other researchers today, history and memory may play different roles in different conflict situations,  influenced by the contexts of different political systems. Earlier there where also suggested that social memory is the product of power struggle; the dominating social group has the hegemony to interpret the past. For example in his research on American public memory, Remaking America(1992) historian John Bodnar concludes that any representation of the past is a product of "elite  manipulation"; the past is a product of the present, memory sites, history textbooks and "National narrative."
The reasons behind the relative lack of attention to history and memory even in W.Europe and the USA, vary widely in different disciplines. In history, the long-standing tradition of seeking "scientific objectivity" until recently did not allow the examination of historical writing in relationship to the articulation of collective memory. In Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework, Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane explained why ideas (including history and memory and other ideational factors) have been underestimated-if not ignored-in the field of international relations. In fact Madeleine Albright recently mentioned some of this in an anecdotal way. (See Albright, The Mighty and the Almighty : Reflections on America, God, and World Affairs, 2006).

According to all of the above, history and memory are not something that stay only in people's minds, they can also be materialized. For example, There are a multitude of ways through which collective memory is standardized and reproduced from national holidays, books, articles in the popular press, documentaries, museums, monuments, films, and other media have  played key roles in the formation of collective memory and identity, both nationally and globally. According to Anthony D. Smith (2003), while these media allow for the exposition and description of a rich tapestry of details, they have to follow a particular logic inherent in nation building. This logic is crystallized in a "national narrative"-the historical tale of the evolution of a particular people through the ages. A specific example was recently presented by  Nicholas B.Dirks in his ‘prologue’ to The Scandal of Empire (2006) where he pointed out in regards to the famous monument of the “Black Hole” in Calcutta that ,”serious historians doubt that the story of the Black Hole is true.” (Dirks, 2006, p.4.)

Summed up, national narrative in most cases, is not an objective description of the past; it is rather an act of selection, appropriation, and proliferation of selected features from the people's past. The national narrative emerges out of forgetting of possible or alternative past and constructing a past that is meaningful in the present context.  These visualized items monuments, statues, hero figures in films and dramas-have provided people evidence of the existence of national history and state identity.

Not unlike Anthony D. Smith, Roudometof (2002, p. 8) contends that the fundamental logic of these narratives entails the following steps: (1) Origins: to trace the beginnings of a people as far back in history as possible; (2) Continuity: showing the preservation of a people's culture, tradition and mentality among the different historical periods; (3) Glory and decline: the identification of periods of glory and decline, including moral judgment; (4) Destiny: the identification of a destiny revealed in the progression of history and the quest for meaning and purpose. This national narrative provides the premises and structure of a general ration or script that other forms of reproduction could operate according to the logic.

History textbooks have been regarded as the major component in the construction and reproduction of national narratives. Some scholars have conducted detailed studies about how different countries deal with the history and memory issues in their education systems and how conflicting national narratives of different sides have generated conflicts. For example, Chunghee Sarah Soh (2003) describes and interprets South Korean citizens' recent national furor over Japanese history textbooks. The author observes that Koreans harbor a deep sense of victimization in their collective memories of the checkered historical relationship with Japan, which, in turn, has generated a nationalist vehemence to vanquish Japan's ethnocentric representations of bilateral and regional events in history textbooks. (Chunghee Sarah Soh, interpreting South Korea's National Furor over Japanese History Textbooks." American Asian Review. Winter 2003. Vol.2l, Iss. 4; 145-179.)

Tomoko Hamada in turn compared three Japanese middle-school history textbooks and one officially approved textbook of China about their descriptions of Japan's colonialism in Asia (1937-1945). This study indicates that the Japanese texts tend to employ formulae for describing the nobility of failure, while the Chinese text follows more closely the conventional hero folktale with such functional units as endurance, struggle, and ultimate victory. (Hamada, "Constructing A National Memory: A Comparative Analysis of Middle-School History Textbooks ftom Japan and the PRC," American Asian Review, Winter 2003.Vol.21, Iss. 4; 109-145.)

In regards to China, a good example was presented earlier this year (2006), when THE WALL STREET JOURNAL reported that the Chinese Government  ordered the  closure of Bingdian Weekly because the weekly argued that “official textbooks inaccurately depicted the 1900 Boxer Rebellion, a nationalist uprising” in which thousands of Chinese Christians and many foreigners were killed. Not surprising, in the same article the WSJ also concluded,” Beijing’s anxiety over a news media that is increasingly driven by market forces and a burgeoning sense of professionalism, rather than official propaganda directives. Authorities have jailed several Chinese journalists in the past two years and moved to tone down feistier publications.” (WSJ, China Shuts Down Outspoken Publication, January 25, 2006 9:13 a.m.)

As for the historical subject mentioned in the WSJ, a hundred years following the 1840 Opium War, China was on the verge of subjugation and loss of its thousands-year-long national identity. The Eight-Power Allied Forces occupied Beijing in 1900. Japan annexed Taiwan and Manchuria and occupied more than 900 cities from China. Hong Kong, Macao, and numerous small areas became oncession zones to foreign powers. The invasion by Western powers and Japan reduced China to the status of semi-colonial society. The Chinese nation was facing a grave threat to national survival.

"The peoples of China are in the most critical time, everybody must roar his defiance." As represented by China's national anthem, a very strong sense of crisis, or sense of insecurity, has always been an important theme of the national political discourse in China. But as seen from even Albright’s (2006) book, the narrative of national salvation depends upon national humiliation; the narrative of national security depends upon national insecurity.

There is a popular political slogan in China, "Never let the historical tragedies be repeated." The government therefore asks people to always keep a wary eye on international "anti-China forces." "Heighten our vigilance and defend our motherland" is another political slogan that was particular popular in China during the 1970’s. After the relaxation and the normalization of the bilateral relationship between China and the U.S., some Party officials and international experts still often warn their colleagues and people not to relax their vigilance against the international "anti-China force," especially the United States. Such kind of remarks on vigilance have even become a sign of being "patriotic" and "sober-minded" for the speakers and became very popular in China's political discourse in the 1990 s, especially during the three incidents mentioned in p.1 of this article series.

Going back to the minutes of the emergency meeting of the Politburo standing committee on May 8, 1999, during the meeting, several standing committee members actually indirectly criticized other members' relaxation ofvigilance and "illusions" about the United States. For example, Li Peng, who was regarded as the chief representative of the CCP hard-liners, made this comment: "This incident more than anything else, reminds us that the United States is an enemy. It is by no means a friend, as some say." (Zong, 76.)

And Wan Li, one of the CCP Elders and the former Chairman of National Congress, was reported to say that "this (the embassy bombing) will be a dose o[ sobering medicine for people who have harbored illusions about the United States. It is time to wake up, is it not?” Wan also added: "Would they (NATO) have dared to do this in the days of the grand old man (nickname for Chairman Mao)? Or in Deng Xiaoping's days? Weak and easily bullied, that's what we are!" (Zong, 86-87)

Wan thought his colleagues need "a dose of sobering medicine" to wake up, and should learn from Mao and Deng to be tough on the United States. And as an example  how leaders use historical analogies to perform specific cognitive and information-processing tasks essential to political decision-making, Deng Xiaoping said in 1990  "I am a Chinese, and I am familiar with the history of foreign aggression against China. When I heard that the seven Western countries, at their summit meeting, had decided to impose sanctions on China, my immediate association was to 1900, when the allied forces of the eight powers invaded China." (http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/dengxp/voI3/text/dl l40.html)

Deng here draws a parallel between the seven Western industrialized countries' economic sanctions on China (as a response to the regime's brutal suppression of the student democratic movement in 1990, with the allied forces of the eight powers' invasion to China in 1900. The one hundred years national humiliation has provided the current Chinese leaders a lot of historical analogies to use and they often draw a parallel between a current event with a historical event. In fact during all the three US-China incidents we mentioned, Chinese state media stoked public outrage by drawing parallels between the current U.S. military actions and the "gunboat diplomacy" of the 19th and early 20th centuries. For instance, a People 's Daily opinion article entitled "China, not in 1899" compared the 1999 embassy bombing with the allied forces of the eight powers' invasion one hundred years ago.

The article declared:
This is 1999, not 1899 in the era when the United States demanded the spheres of influence held by various countries in China had to be open to the United States, they had the so-called equal share of profits without the need to ask whether China agreed or not. It is not the era when Western powers willfully plundered the Imperial Palace, burned down Yuanming Palace and raced to occupy Hong Kong and Macao, nor is it the era when China was under the rule of the corrupt government of the Qing Dynasty and Chiang Kai-shek. China is a eountry which has stood up, which has defeated the Japanese fascists, which has had a trial of strength with the United States in the Korean battlefield and won victory. The Chinese people are not to be bullied, encroachment upon China's sovereignty and dignity is intolerable. In the veins of the Chinese people cireu1ate the blood of the anti-imperialist patriots over a period of more then a hundred years. US-led NATO should bear this in mind. (People's Daily, May 12, 1999, Page 4.)

Sometimes, articles for the People's Daily as is known, are written by senior officials themselves. So during all the three US-China crises, Chinese state media stoked public outrage by drawing parallels between the current U.S. military actions and the "gunboat diplomacy" of the 19th and early 20th centuries.

Thus conspiracy theories about imperialist powers have a long history in China. The May Fourth Movement in 1919, China's first nationalist movement in modern history, was touched off by what Chinese called ''the Versailles conspiracy."
See our earlier case study setting the record straight about China's WWI involvement:

In early 1919, the victorious nations of World War I convened a peace conference in Paris. Britain and the United States dominated the meeting and rejected the Chinese representatives' demands such as taking back the privileges in Shandong that Japan had taken from Germany during World War I. The Chinese warlord government yielded to the pressure exerted by the foreign powers and signed the Versailles Treaty.

 Many Chinese believed that there were schemes among the western powers against China, and even secret agreements between the warlord government and the foreign powers. On May 4th, over 3000 students of Peking University and other schools gathered together and held a demonstration. They shouted out such slogans as "Struggle for sovereignty externally, get rid of national traitors at home." A grand conspiracy among the western powers to divide China and a conflation between enemies and traitors has since then become China's worst security scenario.

Since the days of John Foster Dulles the Chinese leadership has perceived an American campaign to undermine the political authority and rule of the CCP through a combination of sanctions and "peaceful evolution" tactics. In the 1990’s the U.S. emphasis on human rights, the battles over extension of Most Favored Nation trading status, and the opening of Radio Free Asia were all seen in Beijing as proof positive of an American conspiracy to undermine CCP rute. From the Chinese leadership's perspective, the U.S. threat to the CCP's political survival is precisely equated with a threat to national security.

With this historical background, it is thus easier to understand why some Chinese leaders believed that the embassy bombing was intentional and the U.S. aimed to "sound China out" and to "create internal chaos in China." For example, Li Ruihuan said that "The Americans hope for nothing better than to provoke contradictions between the [Chinese] government and the broad masses of people, especially young students, and thereby shift the crisis." (Zong, 79. )

Many Chinese feel that the United States has always trying to keep them down. That was the very first question that a Beijing University student asked President Clinton when he spoke there during his 1998 state visit. One student demonstrator in front of the U.S. embassy in May 1999 was reported to said, quoted by a CCN report: "It's the same old story, when hegemonic powers unite to bully China, it's always the same. They are afraid of China and want to keep us down.” (See "Chinese Embassy bombing exposes raw historical nerve," CNN, May 12, 1999.)

The CNN reporters further observed that "the intensity of thosedemonstrations illustrated how the days of Western intervention in China during the colonial era are sorely remembered by many Chinese."
 

Why Chinese Enmity towards the USA? P.1: Six Questions, more Answers

Sinocentric Historiography Research P.2: It's a Conspiracy Theory