Another source of failure to prepare adequately for surprise events has to do with resources. Even if individuals or organizations are cognitively prepared for a future contingency, they often do not have the right incentives to hedge against it properly. Hedging is costly, and no organization can possibly hedge against all possible contingencies or future states of the world. Whereas a final obstacle to properly guarding against risk is institutional. Hedging against future risks is not just costly; it also requires collective action, specifically, a sharing of decision-making authority and a pooling of resources across organizational and international boundaries. Many predictable risks, like global warming, threats to energy supplies, and infectious diseases constitute public bads, and their mitigation assumes the character of public goods, which economic theory says will be undersupplied by markets alone. Governments must step in to supply global public goods, but there is today a clear undersupply of international institutions in this regard. When a good is public with relation to a single nation-state, then public authority can step in to provide it. Such was the creation of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency as of late. Yet things are more complicated at an international level. In the past, the United States as global hegemon unilaterally supplied certain global public goods like maritime security and support for an open international trading order, because it was in the U.S. interest to do so. We can predict with certainty that we will be surprised; we can and do anticipate an array of catastrophic future events--we can also predict with certainty that when they come, we will be inadequately prepared.
In 1939, Japan began to take steps toward becoming the dominate power in East Asia. In fact, the overall objective was named the East Asia "CoProsperity Sphere," which represented their overall stratagem for the region. The plan called for European influences throughout East Asia to be removed and replaced by Asian power. However, Japan represented the vanguard of Asian power. Thus, the paternalistic control of Asian resources, in their hands, was the real objective for Japan, and not just the removal of the European presence in East Asia. 13 Japan's growing strength in the Pacific region began to be viewed by the U.S. as an irrefutable danger to their positioning in East Asia, especially in the Philippines. By the end of the 1930s, Japan dominated large parts of eastern China, and had total control of Formosa, Korea, and Manchuria. It now cast its eyes upon Southeast Asia, and its valuable natural resources.
Historian Howard Zinn writes in A People's History of the United States that America's entry into WWII was due to the bombing of Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, although as we mentioned in our initial case study about cold war Japan, the US previously already started with a financial siege of Japan.
The final acts of the Pacific campaign were the dropping of atomic bombs upon Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Though, it was recognized by most leaders and policymakers within the U.S. military and government, respectively, in August 1945, that the Pacific War was nearing its end. President Truman, nevertheless, ordered these weapons dropped upon a clearly defeated enemy. Truman believed, and stated continuously afterwards, that he did it to spare the lives of hundreds of thousands of American troops. In short, the U.S. did not have to invade the Japanese mainland as a consequence of the bombings. Thus, the decision, to this day, remains politically controversial and historically complicated for both nations. In Japan, these bombings are presented as proof that they were the real victims of WWII. However, Japan's :wartime behavior, particularly in China, Korea, and Southeast Asia, has been glossed over by the country's educational and political institutions.Thus tough General MacArthur publicly declared himself a possessor of "the Asian mind," in truth, the Asian (including the Japanese) mentality continued to baffle him despite having lived in the region for decades. In reality, General MacArthur was the U.S. government for all intents and purposes during his tenure in Japan. To accomplish the nation-building task of molding and reforming Japanese society to the satisfaction of the U.S. government, General MacArthur was provided with 400,000 American troops to provide the security framework to get the job done. The proposed agenda was certainly broad, intense, and sweeping. In retrospect, this task was probably perceived as daunting and intimidating, at first, for MacArthur and his occupation troops. However, in the end, fundamental reforms did occur at the civic, economic, and political levels within Japanese society. The political changes were truly revolutionary-the sovereignty rested with the people, not with the emperor. The emperor became a useful symbol of Japanese unity and culture-but he had no real power under the new constitution. The primary political institution, in Japan, was now the popularly elected national parliament (the Diet). And the once formidable Japanese Imperial military forces that had only recently conquered large swaths of East Asia were irrevocably dismantled and abolished. In their place, Article 9 of the new constitution, written partly by MacArthur himself but mostly by his legal staff, forbade Japan to maintain an army, and to ever go to war again.By 1949, with the collapse of China's nationalists' government, the plan for radically restructuring Japan's economy appeared risky, if not dangerous for U.S. interests in the region. Japan, in the end, was allowed to control its own development. It was determined by the Truman administration that Japan's economic recovery was the second most important priority-only second to U.S. security interests overall. According to Herbert Bix, a Pulitzer Prize-winning historian and professor of Japanese history, "compared to military occupations of other countries by other armies, the occupation of Japan had been mild and correct; now the peace treaty was extremely generous and non-punitive ... the only reparations that Japan would ever have to pay-approximately 1.02 billion worth of goods and services-were to the Philippines, Indonesia, Burma, and (later) South Vietnam." (Bix, Hirohito and History, ZNet/Activism,30 July, 2005, pp. 650-51).
Though the economic realm is recognized and greatly respected by the U.S. and Japan, their views on foreign policy, particularly toward China and North Korea, have created tensions within this special alliance. There is a growing segment within Japan's foreign policy establishment who are publicly stating it's time for Japan to restructure its foreign policy to match its economic prowess, and support the nation's vital interests.
As we pointed out in our initial case study about modern Japan, there is a strong sentiment within the country to become a "normal country" in terms of creating an independent foreign policy, or at the very least to exercise a bit more autonomy with concern to U.S. regional policies. This populist trend represents a direct threat to America's ability and capacity to remain the hegemonic power within the Pacific Rim. The primary reason for these stimuli within the Japanese foreign policy establishment is primarily the dramatic rise of China-economically and militarily-and, secondarily, North Korea's progress, and unanswered questions, concerning its nuclear weapons program, and its future behavior in Northeast Asia.Both developments are of great concern to Japan and its future status in the Pacific region. To be specific, China's hegemonic potential and North Korea's intransigence on the nuclear issue threaten Japan's future influence, stature, and security in Asia-Pacific. It's a dilemma of great concern to both the U.S. and Japan. The region's balance of power and future stability are at stake. In essence, the region and the world are entering a new phase of global power politics. America's overall stature is incrementally declining, especially due to the twin failures in Afghanistan and Iraq, but also due to China's incredible economic growth rates over the past twenty-five years, and its double-digit military expenditures. When you throw in the unpredictable rogue states of North Korea and Iran, the tinderbox of Taiwanese calls for (potential) independence, and the growing competition for natural resources to keep Asian economies humming along, no wonder many regional analysts are suffering from acid indigestion!
Therefore, let's examine briefly, and with a bit more depth, the volatile relationship between the two most powerful countries in East Asia, China and Japan. And, perhaps, we can understand why this relationship is the key to future prosperity and stability throughout the region. If achieving harmony is beyond the capabilities of these two major powers during the twenty-first century, then the U.S. will certainly be dragged into any conflagration that occurs between the two. If this tragic scenario plays itself out, then it will mean with absolute certainty that the comprehensive and regionally integrated post-WWII economic and security structure designed by the United States will be dismantled. Two major factors will dramatically affect the U.S. economy: First, Chinese money to pay for our growing national debt will disappear. Secondly, the Asian markets for U.S. goods will disappear. It's hard to see any winners in a military confrontation.
Therefore, key questions abound in Asia-Pacific, but particularly with China and Japan. First, when, or can, China and Japan bury the hatchet, like France and Germany did after WWII? Can the U.S. mediate such an event? It's becoming increasingly obvious to the U.S., China, and Japan, and their neighbors throughout Asia-Pacific, that the future would be infinitely more secure and prosperous if these two Northeast Asian behemoths finally dropped their swords aimed toward each other, and worked together to construct a new Asian paradigm. But, in 2007, we appear to be a long way from that moment in history. Therefore, can the U.S. become the "honest broker" needed to bring a common understanding between these two nations who have had a deadly and poisonous recent past? The roots of the present-day poison (and potential death) rest within the soil of China planted there in 1895.
China, a country that has experienced abuse, colonization (Manchuria), imperialism (treaty ports), occupation, and military devastation-much of it at the hands of the Japanese (and Europe too)-is reestablishing itself as the "Middle Kingdom" in East Asia. Historically, and geographically, China has evolved into a unified entity for the first time since the 1840s. Only Taiwan remains outside the fold, in terms of total political control. Ironically, since the 1980s, China and Japan have established prosperous and robust trade relations, and their respective governments continue ongoing negotiations concerning their future economic evolvement into the twenty-first century. Unsurprisingly, though, Japan has also interpreted the reemergence of China with a certain degree of anxiety and wariness. Why?
The terrible physical and psychological wounds suffered by China at the hands ofJapan, and its wartime leaders Emperor Hirohito and Hideki Tojo, since the early 1930s, have not fully healed. In truth, Japan has had great difficulty owning up to its ruthless treatment of China since 1895, which includes the conquests of Taiwan (1895), Korea (1905), and Manchuria (1931), the rape of Nanjing (1937), and the gruesome and irrefutable truth that they literally killed millions of Chinese civilians from 1895 until 1945. Japan's dysfunctional postwar behavior of war crime denials, and shameless acts of nationalism, such as former Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro's visits to the Yasukuni War Memorial, where convicted Class A war criminals are buried, have caused a high degree of angst, anxiety, hysteria, and pain amongst many Asian nations. Renowned historian, Herbert Bix, a professor in the Graduate School of Social Sciences at Hitotsubashi University in Tokyo, believes the key to long-term stability in the region is to teach Asian students about WWII in an honest manner, or the possibility exists that neo-nationalist currents will feed off one another. Peace groups everywhere need to understand the politics of the Northeast Asian nations and work to prevent that from happening. Never has the need for historical reflection on World War II in Asia been greater.
In February 2006, Japan's two major newspapers, Yomiuri and Asahi, and their respective editors, Watanabe Tsuneo and Yoshibumi Wakamiya, took a bold step and jointly called for a new National War Memorial to replace the Yasukuni War Memorial. Essentially, the Yasukuni War Memorial is simply too inflammatory within Asia, and it represents a historical and psychological diplomatic barrier between Japan and East Asia, but particularly with China and Korea.
In the last few years, Japan has pushed very hard to become a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council-a move that China is dead-set against. Yet the Japanese have broad support from other nations, including WWII adversaries America and Australia, who think it is time for the world and the U.N. to move on from its WWII origins, and restructure the institute's most important council to reflect the new geopolitical realities in the world. Nevertheless, there remains some apprehension among some U.N. members, particularly China and South Korea, that Japan has not properly atoned for its brutal and barbaric behavior during WWII. (Jim Frederick, "Why Japan Keeps Provoking China," Time, 10 December 2005).
Thus when President George H. W. Bush was able to convince the leaders of the former Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin, that German unification, in 1990, would not be a threat to Russian security. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, China is seeking the same kind of assurances from the U.S. concerning its most important ally in Asia-Japan. The endgame for this delicate and dangerous situation in Northeast Asia is the following: Do the Chinese trust the U.S. to keep Japan on a short leash, especially militarily, and ensure that China's current economic development will not be derailed by the remilitarization of the Rising Sun?
In fact the key factor in preventing a dangerous situation from evolving into a destructive military confrontation between China and Japan is for both nations to find enough common ground to coexist and prevent a conflagration that will take down the entire region, economically and militarily, including America's post-WWII regional infrastructures that have kept the (relative) peace for over sixty years.
The there is an emerging consensus that the U.S. is implementing an updated and revised version of Cold War containment upon the People's Republic of China. As suggested in our historical overview at the start of this website we believe this to be true. Upon historical hindsight, it can be stated, to a degree of truth, that containment represents a fundamental strategic philosophy that has been implemented since the early nineteenth century. For example John Quincy Adams', then secretary of state under President James Monroe, defined the U.S. position in the Western Hemisphere, in the early 1820s, concerning those European nations seeking an opportunity to re-colonize several Latin American states after Spain's demise. In fact, what Secretary Adams, was actually doing was containing European territorial ambitions within the Western Hemisphere. Upon hindsight, the U.S. was successful in its bold diplomatic efforts to keep Europe out of the region, due to a strong British naval presence in the Atlantic and Caribbean. However, we believe, it can also be effectively argued that the Monroe Doctrine was the first usage of this strategic containment philosophy designed to confront great-power expansionism without the immediate threat of war.
Historically however, China has not looked fondly upon intrusive and threatening outsiders. In fact, China has looked upon the outside world with a considerable amount of skepticism and scorn. First, the Chinese are very proud of their ancient culture and numerous historical achievements in the fields of education, philosophy, literature, and science. Secondly, the dark chapter of Chinese history represented by Europe's (including Japan and America as well) successful attempts to implement exploitive colonialism and imperialism within China, beginning in the mid-nineteenth century until WWII, has left the Chinese hypersensitive to any pressure or threats from external sources. Therefore, it would not surprise this author to see China take calculated steps in limiting U.S. efforts toward achieving this new containment objective in East Asia. The American Eagle encirclement of the Middle Kingdom could very well bring out the worst in the Chinese Dragon. Michael T. Klare, director of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College, sees a dangerous future for America and its recent efforts to contain China since 2001. Professor Klare, author of Blood and Oil; The Dangers and Consequences of America's Growing Dependency on Imported Petroleum, believes that the events of 9/11 only delayed further planning by the first Bush administration (2001-2004) to continue its long-term efforts toward neutralizing China's influence in East Asia. However, Klare writes that the second Bush administration is now, once again, focusing its attentions upon China. He writes, "By the time the second Bush administration came into office, however, the pool of potential rivals had been narrowed in elite thinking to just one: the People's Republic of China. Only China, it was claimed, possessed the economic and military capacity to challenge the United States as an aspiring superpower; and so perpetuating U.S. global predominance meant containing Chinese power." (Klare, "Containing China," www.zmag.org, 18 April 2006).
Yet the reason why, two former methodologies of dealing with a rising hegemonic power will not work with present-day China. First, military confrontation with the Chinese would end globalization as we know it, because China is the economic locomotive for East Asiawhere the fastest-growing economies exist in the world. Also, during the past decade, China has purchased billions of dollars worth of U.S. Treasury bills financing our overconsumption as a society, and American corporations have invested billions into the Chinese economy. All would be lost if a war occurred between these two major powers. Secondly, the implementation of some kind of containment policy will not work either. This places America's allies in an untenable position-pick America or China. America, for many Asia-Pacific nations, represents their security blanket against a rising China, or a resurgent Japan. Though all nations in Asia-Pacific trade with the U.S., there is no doubt, in anyone's mind, that it is the Chinese economy that is pulling the economic wagon in the region.
Either path will lead the United States toward disastrous results: The first path (war) will lead to the potential destruction of regional financial institutions, and regional trade and security agreements established after WWlI. The post-WWl era is a prime example of how difficult it is to put the world back together after a global conflagration. The second path (containment) will potentially produce the political isolation of China-which may very well lead to the destruction of the established regional defense agreements amongst America's most ardent allies since the early 1950s. Put bluntly, several U.S. allies (Australia, South Korea, and Japan) are increasingly dependent upon business contracts with China's government to keep their national unemployment levels low, and their national economies productive and prosperous.
If its key allies in the region perceives America having provoked a military confrontation with China over a rather dubious issue (i.e., trade tariffs, copyright laws, or currency manipulation), or a matter of vital interest to the Chinese (i.e., Taiwan, access to energy, or a preventive attack upon North Korea), America may very well find itself all alone in the biggest geographical backyard in the world-Asia-Pacific. I believe the next ten to fifteen years will be extraordinarily important for the future prosperity and stability of the most important region in the world-some have already termed it the Pacific Century.
It is estimated that the Pacific Rim is home to an estimated 30 percent of the world's population and 20 percent of global (GNP) gross national product. These figures represent almost all the Asian nations that border the Pacific Ocean, or are lumped into this region by their geographical proximity, except Russia (Siberia). Thus, this territory extends from China in the north to Australia in the south, from Myanmar in the west to New Zealand in the east. It is a region with a stunning degree of cultural and ethnic diversity and interconnectedness. Dean Collinwood's book Japan and the Pacific Rim, indicates there are twenty-one countries or administrative entities along or near the Asian side of the Pacific Ocean, plus an almost uncountable number of islands throughout the largest body of water on earth.( Collinwood, Global Studies: Japan and the Pacific Rim (Global Studies Japan and the Pacific Rim,2005, pp. xiv-I.)
China's stature, within the Pacific Rim, would benefit greatly if Taiwan reunited with the Chinese mainland, and if North and South Korean unification became a reality as well. Thus, China's hegemonic status in the region, already being the number one trade partner for Taiwan, Japan, and both Koreas, would certainly rise to a new level of recognition. Japan, on the other hand, would suddenly find itself confronted with two powerful neighbors (China and Korea), economically and militarily, in Northeast Asia. Japan would also have to acknowledge (at least, privately) that China's influence has expanded, and, perhaps, will someday eclipse its own in shaping AsiaPacific affairs. This real potentiality has not gone down well in Tokyo.60 Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski, author of The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership, sees China's rise to political supremacy in Asia as inevitable; "China will become the political leader in East Asia in the near future-in a decade or so."
This new reality is emerging already in conjunction with the search for oil and gas in the East China Sea (Chunxiao gas fields) between China and 0kinawa (Japan), which has already sparked an intense debate about the issue of sovereignty-and who owns what part of the East China continental strategic and centrally (government) directed economic policies. Finally, the region's relatively untapped energy, which includes the Caspian Sea region and western China, makes this area potentially an even more intimidating juggernaut, economically and politically. If development continues at its current pace, the Asia-Pacific Rim region will certainly be positioned to challenge and compete with NAFfA (North American Free Trade Area) and the EU (European Union) for global economic primacy. Presently, the major economic locomotives pulling the region toward development and prosperity are China, Japan, and the "Asian Tigers" (South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore).
However, according to Kent Calder, director of the Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies at SAIS-Johns Hopkins University, the future relations between China and Japan represent the key factor in Asia-Pacific's continued ascendance. These two Asian powerhouses represent approximately 75 percent of the region's economic activity. They also represent half of the region's total expenditures for military hardware. Hence, Professor Calder positions himself in the "realist" camp when it comes to defining the future implications between these two behemoths. His China-Japan analysis sees danger for America and the world, due to a significant degree of bad history existing between the two nations since the late nineteenth century. And, presently, there are serious regional hegemonic, military, and energy challenges confronting them both during the opening decades of the twenty first century. Calder also points out how the potential flashpoints-the Taiwan Strait and the Korean peninsula-represent very different kinds of geopolitical challenges and threats to China and Japan, respectively. (Kent E. Calder, "China and Japan's Simmering Rivalry," Foreign Affairs, March/April2006, Vol. 85, No.2, p. 129).
China's stature, within the Pacific Rim, would benefit greatly if Taiwan reunited with the Chinese mainland, and if North and South Korean unification became a reality as well. Thus, China's hegemonic status in the region, already being the number one trade partner for Taiwan, Japan, and both Koreas, would certainly rise to a new level of recognition. Japan, on the other hand, would suddenly find itself confronted with two powerful neighbors (China and Korea), economically and militarily, in Northeast Asia. Japan would also have to acknowledge (at least, privately) that China's influence has expanded, and, perhaps, will someday eclipse its own in shaping AsiaPacific affairs. This real potentiality has not gone down well in Tokyo. Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski, author of The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership, sees China's rise to political supremacy in Asia as inevitable. He stated, in 2007, during an interview, "China will become the political leader in East Asia in the near future-in a decade or so."
This new reality is emerging already in conjunction with the search for oil and gas in the East China Sea (Chunxiao gas fields) between China and Okinawa (Japan), which has already sparked an intense debate about the issue of sovereignty-and who owns what part of the East China continental shelf. Military activity, particularly by the Chinese, though presently miniscule, only heightens the nationalistic emotions in both nations. And where one group says the U.S. can still be the "essential power" in Asia, by stabilizing the relations between China and Japan. Maintaining constructive and functional relations between these two Asian powers will help not only America, but the world at large. Others come away less than enthralled by the future prospect of its becoming a major Asian power. Internally, these critics have pointed out that China has profound weaknesses, institutionally and structurally, which could seriously undermine their stunning growth levels and plunge the country into chaos and create a significant degree of instability throughout the Pacific Rim. Minxin Pei, a senior associate and director of the China Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, is not one of those overwhelmed or overly impressed by China's "economic miracle." Professor Pei exposes severe flaws within China's economic and governmental structures, and states, "China may be rising, but no one really knows whether it can fly." (Minxin Pei, "The Dark Side of China's Rise," Foreign Policy, March/April 2006, p.40).
The reasons for skepticism, stated by Professor Pei, are persuasive and substantial concerning China's future development. First, the nation's banking system is simply overwhelmed by the influx of foreign investment into the country, and its domestic financial situation is a profit killer as well. Approximately 30 percent of China's current GDP is being absorbed by a banking system drowning in nonperforming loans ("bad paper"). Some China observers, such as Dr. Pei, believe the financial system itself may suddenly implode due to the structural fragility of China's fiscal house. Despite this fundamental weakness within China's financial structure, there continue to be literally hundreds of journal, magazine, and newspaper articles, and dozens of television stories and documentaries, every month, praising China's stunning financial ascendance. Yet there is substantive evidence that clearly indicates that international investors are actually getting a much greater return on their investments in India, rather than in China. This bit of interesting and valuable knowledge is not widely known by the general public, or perhaps even by investors themselves. Also, the nature of China's command economy makes it less transparent, and its methodology of doing business is often not accessible to outside scrutiny, as some economic investors and observers would prefer. In fact, Lester Thurow, the widely read and globally respected economist at MIT, has written that he thinks China's annual growth figures are fudged a bit. Thurow believes that those 9 percent, or 10 percent, annual growth figures that catch the attention of financial analysts throughout the world simply don't hold up upon closer scrutiny. What is the basis of his argument?
First, Professor Thurow strongly implies that there is a certain degree of deception to the national process of data collection, because "China has a bottom-up reporting system and a top-down promotion system." In short, Beijing hands out promotions based upon good economic numbers-and Thurow states the local leaders know this before they send their economic reports to the national government. Secondly, he questions the "statistical consistency" and quantification of data by the Chinese government itself. Thurow refutes the Chinese government's sparkling statistical declarations by applying statistical logic, and, thus, using it to examine the reality of China's urban and rural income development rates: China admits that there has been little or no growth in the countryside in the last 15 years. A total of 70 percent of Chinese citizens live in the countryside. Do a little simple algebra. If a country grows at 10 percent and 70 percent of its citizens do not enjoy any growth, how fast do the incomes of the other 30 percent have to grow? The answer is 32 percent. Shanghai and other Chinese cities are growing rapidly, but they are not growing 32 percent a year. (LesterThurow, "China's Statistics Don't Add Up," The Banker, 2 August 2004).
Thurow's analysis appears to quantitatively refute the media hype and hysteria concerning China's overall economic development. Professor Pei also points out in his own article that the "wealth gap" is enormous in China. The top 1 percent of Chinese families control more than 60 percent of the nation's wealth (compared to 5 percent in the U.S.). And the Beijing government controls approximately 38 percent of Chinese GDP. Obviously, one can clearly see that China's economic wealth is not equitably distributed, nor has it promoted political pluralism within the Middle Kingdom. Nevertheless, China's stunning growth over the past quarter century has had a profound effect upon its regional and global standing. Allan Behm, a strategic analyst and former senior Australian defense department official, stated, "(China) has the world's largest and most dynamic population coming into its own as an economic, political and strategic force." (David Lague, "Coming to Terms with China's Ascent," International Herald Tribune-Asia-Pacific, 7 November 2005).
Behm is not wrong, but neither is Thurow or Pei. Hence, the question asks itself-Can China continue to grow, at its present rate, if significant individual and provincial economic imbalances remain unaddressed by the central government? Not likely, because the common worker and the local governments in the poorer regions of China, will want substantive evidence that the national government is committed to their betterment. In short, workers will expect better pay, and local governments will demand substantial investment into their local communities by the national government Those imbalances, mentioned above, will only be exacerbated because there is emerging qualitative evidence that indicates China's current rate of economic growth will not be sustained during the next couple of years, according to the World Bank. China experienced 10.4 percent growth in 2006, but this could quite possibly drop to 8.7 percent by 2008. The primary rea- sons for the approximately 20 percent decline in annual growth, according to the Associated Press story, is due to "high investment rates and excess capacity in several sectors dominated by state-owned enterprises [that] leave open the possibility of a sharp decline in investment."(The Wall Street Journal, 14 December 2006). If this momentary economic decline evolves into a lengthy trend, China's well-being and Asia Pacific's future stability may be tested sooner than anticipated.
In the final analysis, America, Australia, China, Japan, South Korea, and the other national entities throughout the Asia-Pacific Rim are now standing at the proverbial crossroads in the twenty-first century. Their future economic prosperity and security will be achieved only if there is a serious collective effort by the major powers within the region. However, the key question remains unanswered at this time-can this vast region consisting of multiple cultures, ethnicities, languages, and political ideologies find enough common ground to continue its global ascendance in the twentyfirst century? What will it be-Pearl Harbor or peace?
The next twenty-five years will determine whether the Asia-Pacific Rim finally emerges, as predicted by many analysts and scholars, as the new economic-military axis in global affairs. Or will this period of history, as some suspect, be remembered for the lost opportunities toward creating a greater peace and prosperity throughout the region? America, Australia, China, Japan, and South Korea will certainly play key roles in the region's destiny. But, we believe, America and China have a golden opportunity to redirect history and, perhaps, establish a new historical path that will permit both nations to coexist and provide visionary leadership, economically and militarily, within the Asia-Pacific Rim region. Therefore, despite credible historical evidence to the contrary; we simply do not believe, that the bloody and destructive hegemonic wars of yesteryear represent the inevitable fate of the Pacific Rim in the twenty-first century.
In fact even a new aspect of Chinese contingency war planning for dealing with Taiwan in the event that the island declares independence has already been emerging. China's potential strategy now, centers on a punishing bombardment of Taiwan rather than a full-scale amphibious invasion. While there are a number of problems with this strategy, the shift in thinking - away from occupying the island and bringing it back into the mainland fold and toward bombardment and restoring the status quo - is significant.
