In the movie, when von Stauffenberg as Cruise, returns from Africa he joins the German Resistance and helps create Operation "Valkyrie," the complex plan that will allow a shadow government to replace Hitler's once he is dead. It is however generally accepted by historians today, that the ”July 20 plotters” depicted in Valkyrie; believed in revolution from above. Or as Hans Mommsen elaborated, their "plans for a new order relied extensively on neoconservative and corporatist ideas of the Weimar period, in particular going back to Spengler's model of a 'Prussian socialism.' For a number of the conspirators ... the Prussian tradition represented a central motive for the decision to join the resistance."1
But as already suggested, the public image of the German aristocracy during the Nazi period to date, have indeed been largely shaped by the well-known events depicted in Valkyrie. This became especially visible in context of the sixtieth anniversary of the assassination attempt, following which it has frequently been pointed out how strongly aristocrats themselves were committed (and has been ever since 1945)-- to stressing the aristocratic resistance to National Socialism. This has produced a view today in which the history of the aristocracy under Nazism is practically identified with that of the resistance. That is until shortly after a 2003 when a major academic work by Stephan Malinowski came out, in which for the first time-- the real relationship between the aristocracy and National Socialism was examined.4
What emerged from Malinowski ‘s 660 pages in depth research, is that indeed large sections of the German aristocracy, became radically right wing after 1918 (something we earlier expanded on in from Kaiser to Fuehrer). Among others, on p. 570 of his book, Malinowski pointed out that the Nazis kept very good records— one document in the German Federal Archives contains a list of no less than 270 members of princely families who had joined the Nazi Party. While it was difficult to provide an exact percentage, it appeared that about a third of the princes eligible to do so had joined the NSDAP. For the first time ever, published on the internet (Nov.30,2007), underneath the footnotes, you can see the complete list from the Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde.(Sammlung Schumacher, R. 187/400, "Aufstellung derjenigen Parteigenossen, die Angehoerige fuerstlicher Hauser sind.")
Thus among others, in 1938, 18.7 percent of the lieutenant generals (Obergruppenfuhrer); 9.8 percent of the major generals (Gruppenfuhrer); and 14.3 percent of the brigadier generals (Brigadefuhrer) were members of the aristocracy.5 Among the Higher SS and Police Leaders, eight of forty-four stemmed from the nobility (Oberschicht).6 While it is an exaggeration to use the phrase that was "popularly bandied about after the war that the SS was 'at times almost a nursing home for princes,'" there were organic ties between the nobility and Himmler's elite.7
But of course, the relationship between the aristocracy and the extreme right, and National Socialism in particular, cannot be reduced to a common denominator during the interwar period. But a combination of biographical and history-of experience approaches will help us with the explanation of political orientations and patterns of political behavior among the aristocracy as well as others during the Nazi years.8
Of major significance however is that ever since the late summer of 1918, the stab-in-the-back myth (Dolchstosslegende) had begun to take shape among the Prussian-German officer corps, which was still dominated by the aristocracy.9 The feelings that cavalry captain Andreas Graf von Bernstorff confided to his diary on 11 October were by no means unique:
In Germany, every truly loyal German (treudeutsch) man naturally hangs his head in shame that our Jewish-Social Democratic government has destroyed everything that the sword achieved. All the sacrifice in vain! The army can no longer fight willingly if there is no will for victory at home, only an anxiety that Germany should not gain anything in this war.10
In talk of the stab-in-the-back, which pervaded not only the early history of the Weimar Republic like a theme with variations, old and deeply rooted resentments, in the case of the aristocracy, against liberal democracy, parliamentarism, and the “unpatriotic fellows” (vaterlandslose Gesellen) of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) combined with a search for explanations for the problems and troubles, the actual or imagined experiences of loss and decline in the present. Beyond this, the stab-in-the-back was also a mechanism for easing one's own burden by shifting the blame for the current situation, both individual and collective, onto others, while deflecting it from the forces and actors of one's own in-group. For those aristocrats, in particular, for whom war's end and revolution had come as a dramatic interruption of life plans and career prospects (especially in the armed forces), such attributions of blame and justifications for social decline were of central significance.11
The end of the monarchy and the Weimar Republic's numerous constitutional and legal regulations that curtailed or abolished the privileges of the aristocracy, and, from the point of view of the state, at least placed its special socio-political role in question, hit the whole of the aristocracy as a group. The arguments associated with the stab-in-the-back, and their function of consolidating a group which could see itself as a victim of defeat in war and revolution, of democracy and parliamentary constitution, should be placed in the context of the attempt to rebuild a collective identity, and to boost the solidarity and homogeneity of social groups, which was especially important for the aristocracy. In fact this adoption of the role of victim and the anti-republicanism it led to, are significant for the political radicalization of the German aristocracy. The view that one was a victim (Opfer) of 'left-wing' machinations easily combined with other Opfer topoi: talk of the aristocracy's “blood sacrifice” (Blut-Opfer) on the battlefields of the world war, which had proved to be in vain.12
The Prussian-German military aristocracy, in particular, the foundations of whose existence had been shattered by demilitarization after 1918, would have been attracted by the ideas of 'soldierly-militant leadership' circulating everywhere in nationalist circles, but particularly in the rising Nazi movement. 9 Such ideas of a new leadership combined easily with anti-Semitism, which was an integral part of the stab-in-the-back myth. Marcus Funck in this context spoke of a 'racial-national warrior community'.13 This is of importance because, beyond all the career opportunities which Nazi policy for war and rearmament offered after 1933, especially to the aristocracy from the regions east of the Elbe, it helps to explain the attractiveness of Nazi ideas long before 1933.
Informed historians have repeatedly pointed to anti-Bolshevism as the force driving the right-wing radicalization of the aristocracy, and this is not to be denied (we researched this before). However we should stress, that the most radical opponents of the Republic and democracy would hide behind this basic anti-Bolshevik consensus; thus anti-Bolshevism could camouflage the most radical goals, which could be made to look attractive and presentable.
Furthermore the conservative and voelkisch right, could not imagine replacing the Weimar Republic with anything but a restoration of the monarchy, and this form of monarchism was associated with ideas of a charismatic leadership. And exactly this provided the bridge for the aristocracy, and especially for the younger generation, born around 1890/1900, which denounced the decadence of Wilhelminism. This generation could not see a monarch like Wilhelm II as a model and, after the Kaiser's flight and abdication, accused him of betraying the people.14 Of course, neither Crown Prince Wilhelm of Prussia, the Kaiser's eldest son, nor other Hohenzollern princes were suitable new monarchs in the eyes of these aristocrats. This led increasingly to a search for a replacement monarch, for a different charismatic Fuhrer figure who, with a strong hand, would not only restore the lost order, but also unify the people behind him and lead the Reich to new greatness. “Only a dictator can help us now”, wrote Andreas von Bernstorff in 1928, “someone who will sweep away this international bunch of parasites with an iron broom. If only, like the Italians, we had a Mussolini!”15 Given the support by younger aristocrats at the time, suggests that Mussolini's seizure of power in Italy helped to dissolve traditional monarchism among the German aristocracy, especially as the establishment of the fascist dictatorship did not formally put an end to the Italian monarchy.16
The Count Bemstorff quoted above , born in 1868, furthermore shows us that the alienation from the Hohenzollern empire and monarchy, and from monarchism as such, was not, as is mostly claimed, limited to the younger generation of aristocrats.
The restoration of the Hohenzollem was a political project whose aim was to transform the Republic in an authoritarian way, and the longer the Republic lasted, the greater the political significance of this project became. This political monarchism was largely promoted by aristocratic politicians, especially those in the Deutschnationale Volkspartei (DNVP; German National People's Party). Its primary aim, however, was to sweep away the Republic, not to restore the Hohenzollem dynasty.
This glance at aristocratic monarchism and its mutation into a search for a charismatic Fuhrer would be incomplete; however, if we did not mention that monarchist attitudes could also be an obstacle to a rapprochement between the aristocracy and the Nazi movement. This was especially true in the case of the Bavarian aristocracy, which made up a significant proportion of the monarchist and legitimist movement in Bavaria. It is typical that plans for a monarchist coup d’etat in Bavaria in February-March 1933 aimed to prevent a Nazi dictatorship, not to strengthen it.17 Monarchism as such thus neither encouraged friendly relations between the aristocracy and the radical right, nor prevented them. Thus our analysis must look at the individual monarchists involved, and ask what the motives behind their monarchism were. Was their primary goal to restore the monarchy, or to abolish the Republic? What were the sources feeding their monarchism?
In seeking an answer to this question, the literature and the Catholic aristocracy have repeatedly pointed to the significance of denomination. It is claimed that the Protestant aristocracy had a greater affinity for Nazism, while the Catholic aristocracy (exemplified again by Tom Cruise as Graf von Stauffenberg in Valkyrie) kept their distance, at least relatively.18 But what may have been true for most of the Bavarian Catholic aristocracy certainly, did not apply to the Catholic aristocracy of Westphalia.19
To ad another comparison, in nearby Belgium (a staunch enemy of Germany during WWI), there was according to historical experts a fairly strong support for the Nazi’s among Catholic nobility.20
Not unlike in Germany also in Belgium there was a gradual surrender of its influence on society by the Belgium aristocracy following WWI there was a gradual surrender of its influence on society by the Belgium aristocracy, and on the eve of the Second World War Belgian aristocracy represented a relative limited amount of 0.13 per cent of the Belgian population. 21
Here the Dutch, in Belgium meaning ‘Flemish’- speaking nobility, initially was more attracted to the Association of National Solidarity Supporters of a Greater Netherlands (het Verbond van Dietsche Nationaal Solidaristen) generally called Verdinaso organization; founded by (aristocrat) Joris van Severen in 1931. Verdinaso was committed to an authoritarian, nationalist, and fascist Greater Netherlands state, and sponsored a corporatist professional organization, a youth organization, and a militia. Above all the fact that Verdinaso also put loyalty to the king first was important for its aristocratic followers. However, following the execution of its leader in May 1940, aristocratic membership dropped drastically.22
Thus the Rexism of Leon Degrelle became the largest pro-Nazi group in Belgium. Coming out of Catholic Action, Degrelle advocated an authoritarian model for society which was based on anti-liberalism, anti-socialism, and anti-Communism, initially with a patriotic and royalist slant.23
When during the Nazi occupation of Belgium (Belgium’s King collaborated, although not openly, with the Nazi’s) Degrelle responded by turning his organization into a branch of the German SS, also he during WWII alienated many aristocrats (and Catholics). In fact not unlike what happened with Graf von Stauffenberg in Valkyrie the movie, many Belgian aristocrats, moved over to the resistance (even they remained anti-Semitic).24
Earlier, now back to Germany; Hindenburg's election and the temporary political and economic stabilization of Germany that it brought about allowed the animosity towards the Weimar Republic of the aristocracy, and other social groups, to fade into the background for a time. However, this should not obscure the fact that a social and cultural anti-modernism-which, incidentally, long predated the Weimar Republic-was by no means moderated, let alone eliminated, by Hindenburg's presidency. The individual elements of this socio-cultural anti-modernism, ranging from hostility to big cities to anti-Americanism and anti-capitalism, continued and were constantly reconfirmed by the aristocracy's perceptions of the times. This aristocratic anti-modernism was not only a parallel phenomenon to the anti-modernism of the early Nazi-party, but closely connected with it. The crucial link was anti-Semitism, which was increasingly being enlisted by the aristocracy, among others, not only to explain political developments (such as the 1918 revolution), but also to interpret social and cultural perceptions of crisis, and thus to confront the aristocracy's own experiences of loss and decline. From here it was but a small step to crude anti-Semitic conspiracy theories. This is not the individual Jew, but international Jewry with enormous financial resources (or the Jews as a race), which had already infiltrated a number of German aristocratic organizations in the years just before the First World War.25 Thus for large parts of the German aristocracy, the Nazis' racial anti-Semitism was neither new nor something they had to get used to, and this included until his end, Graf von Stauffenberg.26
The redefinition and reconstruction of the aristocracy as an elite was especially strongly influenced by the early Nazi party’s stock of ideas for a number of reasons. Under the conditions of a (Weimar) republic, it had become difficult to revert to the orientation towards the state that had dominated among the aristocracy before 1918. Precisely because the aristocracy had so long seen itself as a class that supported the state, thereby legitimizing both itself and the many privileges it had enjoyed right to the end of the monarchical state, it was now unable suddenly to transfer its loyalty to a democratic republic. If, however, the line of continuity of orientation by the state and service to it had broken in 1918, all that was left for the aristocracy, and especially for the many anti-republicans among its ranks, was the Volk, the people, at whose head and in whose service they could look beyond the caesura of 1918, and understand and legitimize their own position. The Volk was not a new point of reference, but something that had always been there, and this appealed to the aristocracy's sense of history and continuity.27
Beyond this, the voelkisch and early Nazi orientation gave its aristocratic supporters a wide field of associates who shared their aversion to the Republic. In an attempt not to be marginalized within the heterogeneous voelkisch camp, and indeed, to maintain their traditional claim to leadership, the continued use of the term 'aristocracy' as a synonym for a political and social elite seemed helpful. If the 'aristocracy' functioned as a symbolic leadership elite and model for a new elite, then why should the historical aristocracy not form at least part of-the 'new aristocracy' that was being talked about everywhere? After all, the aristocracy had been putting voelkisch principles into practice for centuries both in its view of itself and its existence from generation to generation. Since the nineteenth century at the latest, the aristocracy had regarded the land that it controlled (though increasingly less exclusively), farmed, and lived on, as the central pillar of its identity; indeed, as a defining aristocratic feature. And it was not only aristocrats with voelkisch affinities who thought so. Ewald von Kleist-Schmenzin, one of the last representatives of an Old Prussian conservatism who was completely untainted by any suspicion of voelkisch affinities and was murdered by the Nazis in 1944, wrote in 1926:
There is one area where the aristocracy must preserve its position with special care, and that is the land. The roots of its power lie in the possession of a large estate, and that is where they will always lie. The aristocracy must never lose its leadership on the land, otherwise, in the long or short term, its existence will be threatened, for powers which rejuvenate the body and the soul stream constantly from the land. Ultimately, that is the origin of most of the Prussian-Junker world view, which is totally opposed to the modern world, and which is destined to save our people.28
In addition to its attachment to the land, the aristocracy's specific family awareness also created points of contact with the stock of voelkisch ideas. This started with the aristocracy's awareness of lineage, and carried on with its selection of partners, marriage patterns, and reproductive behaviour, which was governed by the maxim: 'maintain the aristocratic stock and name'. Instilled by education and socialization, this maxim dictated aristocratic behaviour for generations.29
Consciousness of belonging to a social order or Estate directed towards the reproduction of the aristocratic family did this not, in nuce, point in the same direction as thinking that demanded purity of race and blood, was orientated by principles such as selection and selective breeding, and developed racial hierarchies based on biology and blood? Quite a few aristocrats saw it in these terms. And conversely, a number of adherents of voelkisch-racist thinking saw the aristocracy, or, at least, the principle of aristocracy, as the model of a leadership class at least potentially formed by breeding.30
Examination of such soft factors should not, of course, obscure the fact that throughout the Weimar Republic, but especially during its closing phases, there were also hard political factors and common interests that made emergent National Socialism more attractive for the aristocracy, and helped to remove its reservations about the Nazi movement. To this belonged among others, the agrarian crisis, which became more acute from 1929, for the politicization and radicalization of the aristocracy.31
In this context also anti-Bolshevism in 1930, experienced a resurgence against the background of quasi-civil war in Germany, and drove the aristocracy, among others, into the arms of the Nazi Party (as members or voters). Individual events which created connections between the aristocracy and the radical right should also be mentioned, such as the referendum of 1926 on the expropriation of the princes,32 quite apart from such general and overarching factors as the Versailles syndrome.33
The latter point, of course, shows that hard and soft factors cannot always be clearly distinguished, and recent cultural history approaches have contributed to at least relativizing these boundaries. We could also point to the significance of the idea of the Reich for the affinity which developed between the old aristocracy and the extreme right. The concept of the Reich was an important bridging element in the relationship between the aristocracy and the new right, as well as in that between Catholicism (right-wing Catholicism in particular) and National Socialism.34
In the end it also makes sense to stress the reciprocal relationship between the aristocracy and the radical right, to identify opportunities for political, cultural, or intellectual affinities. The organizations of the radical right, in particular, the rising Nazi Party, quite openly courted the aristocracy for a number of reasons. They saw recruiting the aristocracy with its opinion-forming role as a way of gaining the support of new groups of rural voters, for example. They also saw it as potentially providing a corrective to the image of the Nazi Party and its organizations as a vulgar, brutal, lower-class movement, and as a way of adapting to the ideal of a racially defined Volksgemeinschaft·
The aristocracy's, or individual aristocrats', proximity to or distance from the radical right cannot be explained only in terms of the extent of social and economic or material decline after 1918. It was not only members of the 'aristocratic proletariat' who turned to National Socialism, although they represented the largest group.35 Agreement on national politics and common patterns of cultural perception (especially interpretations of modernity and modernization processes) should be mentioned here.
But usually observations of the aristocracy during the Nazi era is based on perceptions of crisis, the experience of crisis, or an attempt to overcome crisis.36 Into a wider temporal context: crisis becomes a leading concept in the history of the aristocracy, and today is used a conceptual starting point for a European comparison, in particular, with respect to the interwar period.37 See also Andreas Wirsching's investigation of political extremism in Paris and Berlin.38 After all, it was also Graf von Stauffenberg sense of crisis (depicted by his soul-searching in Valkyrie the movie)-- that drove him to try and make an end to Hitler’s misdirected ‘Third Reich’.
A general disenchantment by supporting aristocrats regarding the nature of the Nazi leadership appears to have coalesced in mid-1943. Becoming markedly more anxious and radical, in August of that year Hitler sacked Wilhelm Frick as Reich minister, replacing him with Himmler. And some of the people close to Hitler knew that his physical condition started to decline that year, especially after he almost suffered a breakdown after the debacles in Stalingrad and North Africa.
Thus for example Princess (of Greece and Denmark wife of Prince Christoph of Hessen) Sophia, referred to this period when she wrote to her grandmother Victoria after the war (when full details about the holocaust had emerged for during the war she certainly would not have used the word ‘criminals’) in May 1945: "Since 2 years my eyes have been opened & you can imagine what feelings one has now about those criminals."39
Princess Sophia as some might recall, was the sister of Prince Philip the Duke of Edinburgh. Below on the right, the son of the former Kaiser Wilhelm II, Prince August Wilhelm; locking arms with Princess Sophia’s brother in law, Prince Philip of Hessen—both in Nazi uniforms.
Prince August Wilhelm’s older brother the German Crown Prince Wilhelm, “went all out for the NSDAP.”40
Below Crown Prince Wilhelm campaigning for Hitler in the presidential election of 1932:
Both Crown Prince Wilhelm and his brother Prince August Wilhelm where prominently present when after the Reichstag fire, on 21 March 1933, Hiter’s Nazi parliament opened for the first time. The Hessens and other nobles did their part by including the Nazi flag over their castles. Thus the that time enthusiastic Princess Sophia, noted in February 1933, " ... when Prince zu Waldeck flew with Hitler in one of the election campaigns, they flew over Friedrichshof, and he says he saw the flag on the Burg!"41
But as we have
seen this aristocratic renaissance in Germany in no way constitutes a revival
of the old order. The Nazis, through the class war they launched after
1941 and through their defeat at the hands of the Allies, helped carry
out a revolution. But in a sense, one can say that as a result of World
War II, German royals finally lost their Reich.
1. Hans Mommsen, "Der Widerstand gegen Hitler und die deutsche Gesellschaft." In Der Widerstand gegen den Nationalsozialismus. Die deutsche Gesellschaft und der Widerstand gegen Hitler, edited by Jiirgen Schmadeke and Peter Steinbach. Munich: Piper, 1986, 10.
2. Eckart Conze, "Adel und Adeligkeit im Widerstand des 20.Juli 1944." In Adel und Buergertum in Deutschland 3 , edited by Heinz Reif, Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2001,269-95.
3. Friedrich Wilhelm Prinz von Preussen, Das Haus Hohenzollern, 1918-1945. Munich, 1985, 275.
4. Stephan Malinowski, Vom Konig zum Ffihrer: Sozialer Niedergang und politische Radikalisierung im deutschen Adel zwischen Kaiserreich und NS-Staat (Berlin, 2003).
5. Ruth Bettina Birn. Die hoeheren SS- und Polizeifiihrer: Himmlers Vertreter im Reich und in den besetzten Gebieten. Dusseldorf: Droste, 1986, 353 . Note that the category Oberschicht is comprised of Rittergutsbesitzer (estate owners) and Hochadel (high aristocracy).
6. Bernd Wegner, The Waffen-SS: Organization, Ideology and Function. Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1990, 245.
7. See for example Wencke Meteling, 'Der deutsche Zusammenbruch 1918 in den Selbstzeugnissen adeliger preullischer Offiziere'in Eckart Conze and Monika Wienfort (eds.), Adel und Modeme: Deutschland im europaischen Vergleich im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (Cologne, 2004)., 289-321; Rainer Pomp, 'Brandenburgischer Landadel und die Weimarer Republik: Konflikte urn Oppositionsstrategien und Elitenkonzepte', in Kurt Adamy and Kristina Hiibener (eds.), Adel und Staatsverwaltung in Brandenburg im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert: Ein historiscker Vergleich (Berlin, 1996), 185-218; or Eckart Conze, Von deutschem Adel: Die Grafen von Bernstoiff im 20. Jahrhundert (Stuttgart, 2000), esp. '49-88.
8. See in particular Boris Barth, Dolchstosslegenden und politische Desintegration: Das Trauma der deutschen Niederlage im Ersten Weltkrieg 1918-1933 (Dusseldorf, 2003).
9. Andreas Graf Bemstorff (1868-1945), unpublished diary, Tagebuch, x. 57, 11 Oct. 1918.
10. On this see Friedrich Freiherr Hiller von Gaertringen, , "Dolchstoss"Diskussion und "Dolchstoss"-Legende im Wandel von vier Jahrzehnten', in id. and Waldemar Besson (eds.), Geschichte und Gegenwartsbewusstsein: Historische Betrachtungen und Untersuchungen. Festschrift fuer Hans Rothftls zum 70. Geburtstag (Gottingen, 1963), 122-60; Detlef Lehnert, 'Propaganda des Burgerkrieges? Politische Feindbilder in der Novemberrevolution als mentale DestabiJisierung der Weimarer Demokratie', in id. and Klaus Megerle (eds.), Politische Teilkulturen zwischen Integration und Polarisierung: Zur politischen Kultur der Weimarer Republik (Opladen, 1990),61-101, esp. 63-8.
11. Marcus Funck, 'Schock und Chance: Der preussische Militaradel in der Weimarer Republik zwischen Stand und Profession', in Reif (ed.), Adel und Burgertum, 127-71, esp. 139-42; and Meteling, “Der deutsche Zusammenbruch”. The German word Opfer means both 'victim' and 'sacrifice'; this is a prerequisite for the widespread German Opfer discourse.
12. Marcus Funck, 'The Meaning of Dying: East Elbian Noble Families as "War Tribes" in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries', in Matt Berg and Greg Eghigian (eds.), Sacrifice and National Belonging in Twentieth-Century Germany (College Station, Tex., 2001), 26-63.
13. Marcus Funk, 'Vom Holling zum soldatischen Mann: Varianten und Umwandlungen adeliger Mannlichkeit zmschen Kaiserreich und Nationalsozialismus', in Conze and Wienfort (eds.), Adel und Moderne, 205-35, esp. 225-34.
14. Martin Kohlrausch, 'Die Bucht des Kaisers: Doppeltes Scheitern adelig-biirgerlicher Monarchiekonzepte', in Reif (ed.), Add und Biirgertum, 65-101.
15. Bernstorff, Tagebuch, xviii. 27,1 Mar. 1928.
16. Ironically only some days ago on November 25, even Umberto Eco (who himself is a historian) when asked; “Are you saying that Germany got the idea of fascism from Italy?” answered; “Oh, certainly. According to what the historians say, it is so.”
17. On Bavarian monarchism see Robert S. Garnett, Lion, Eagle, and Swastika: Bavarian Monarchism in Weimar Germany (New York, 1991); Karl Otmar Freiheit von Aretin, 'Die bayerische Regierung und die Politik der bayerischen Monarchisten in der Krise der Weimarer Republik 1930-1933', in Festschrift fuer Hermann Heimpel zum 70. Geburtstag am 19. September 1971, Veroeffentlichungen des Max-Planck-Instituts fur Geschichte, 36, Goettingen, 205-37; Erwein Freiherr von Aretin, Krone und Ketlen: Erinnerungen eines bayerischen Edelmannes (Munich, 1955); and Rudolf Endres, 'Der Bayerische Heimat- und Kiinigsbund', in Andreas Kraus (ed.), Land und Reich, Stamm und Nation: Probleme und Perspektiven bayerischer Geschichte. Festgabe Max Spindler zum 90. Geburtstag (Munich, 1984), iii·415-36.
18. Friedrich Keinemann, Soziale und politische Geschichte des wesifiilischen Adels 1815-1945 (Hamm, 1975), and id., Vom Krummstab zur Republik: Westphaelischer Adel unter preuzischer Herrschaft 18o:C-1945 (Bochum, 1997); cf. also Gerhard Kratzsch, Engelbert Reichsfreiherr von Kerckerinck zur Borg: Wesifiilischer Adel zwischen Kaiserreich und Weimarer Republik (Munster, 2004).
19. On this see Malinowski, Vom Konig zum Fuhrer, 385-94.
20 Ginette Kurgan-van Hentenryck (ed.), Dictionnaire des Patrons (Brussels, 1996), 13; 16Marie-Pierre d'Udekem d'Acoz (nee Verhaegen), Voor Koning en Vaderland (Tielt, 2003).,361; Jan C. H. Blom and Emiel Lamberts, History of the Low Countries (1St edn.; New York, 1999), 348-65'.
21 Luc Duerloo, 'Adelserkenning en rehabilitatie', in Le Droit nobiliaire et le Conseil Heraldique (I884-I994),1 Het adelsrecht en de Raad ,an Adel (I884-I994) (Brussels, 1994), 217-20;Jos de Belder, 'Veranderingen in de social economische positie van de Belgische adel in de 19de eeuw: Een terreinverkenning', Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis, 92 (1980), 483-501.
22 Antoon van Severen, Joris van Severen: Het verhaal van een leven, 2 vols. (Torhout, 1998), ii. 165-247; Lieven Saerens, 'Het "Wendepunkt" (1933-1940)', in Peter Terlinden's book L'Espagne marryre (1937) and Count Alexandre van der Burch's Le Calvaire iberique (1938,.21.)
23 Emmanuel Gerard, 'La responsabilite du monde catholique dans la naissance et l'essor du rexisme', La Revue nouvelle (Jan. 1987), 67-77; Conway, 'Explications pour un echec', 83-5; Alain Colignon, 'Le Rexisme, un pre-Poujadisme?', in Balace, Braive, and Colignon (eds.), L'Extreme droite, 41,7.
24. When we asked the Belgian historian (and Indologist who specializes in Nationalism) Dr.Koenraad Elst, about related issues he answered by e-mail: Last year there was an exhibition in my country, Belgium, about the Resistance press of World War 2. Most visitors found it bizarre or funny to read on the cover of one of those anti-Nazi papers a clarification to this effect: “Because we fight the Nazis, some people might think that we are pro-Jewish. Far from it! But Jews are human beings too.” That pretty much sums up a widespread view in those days. The Church too disliked the Jews but nonetheless opposed their deportation and helped many to hide or to escape. This humane intervention was not seen as in contradiction with doctrinal anti-Judaism, which didn’t require Jews to be deported or killed.
25. Aristocratic anti-Semitism is mentioned by Heinz Reif, 'Antisemitismus in den Agrarverbanden Ostelbiens wahrend der Weimarer Republik', in id. (ed.), Ostelbische Agrargesellschqft im Kaiserreich und in der Weimarer Republik: Agrarkrise,junkerliche Interessenpolitik, Modernisierungsstrategien (Berlin, 1994), 379-411, esp. 381; Christof Dipper speaks of 'upperclass anti-Semitism', in his essay, 'Der Widerstand und dieJuden', inJurgen Schmadecke and Peter Steinbach (eds.), Der Widerstand gegen den Nationalsozialismus: Die deutsche Gesellschaft und der Widerstand gegen Hitler (Munich, 1994), 598-616, esp. 599. See also http://soc.world-journal.net/holocaust.html
26. Shulamit Volkov, Antisemitismus als kultureller Code, 2nd edn. Munich, 2000. As an aside, just this week a trove of documents the Allied forces began collecting before the end of the war and entrusted to the Red Cross, has been opened to the public. It will offer new avenues of study into the inner workings of Nazi persecution from the exploitation of slave labor to the conduct of medical experiments. The archive's managers planned a conference of scholars next year to map out its unexplored contents.
27. Heinz Reif, 'Mediator between Throne and People: The Split in Aristocratic Conservatism in Nineteenth-Century Germany', in Bo Strath (ed.), Language and Construction of Class Identities (Goteborg, 1990), 133-50.
28. Quoted from Bodo Scheurig, Ewald v. Kleist-Schmenzin: Ein Konservativer gegen Hitler (Oldenburg, 1968), 28.
29. Heinz Reif, 'Erhaltung adligen Stammes und Namens: Adelsfamilie und Statussicherung im Munsterland 1770-1914', in Neithard Buist et al. (eds.), Familie zwischen Tradition und Moderne: Studien zur Geschichte tier Familie in Deutschland und Frank:reich Dom 16. bis :cum 20. ]ahrhundert (Gottingen, 1981), 275-309.
30. This also applied to the SS, which saw itself as a new aristocracy defined by race. In its conception of this new aristocracy, the SS referred back to the model of the old, historical aristocracy. On this see Eckart Conze, 'Adel unter dem Totenkopf: Die Idee eines Neuadels in den Gesellschaftsvorstellungen der SS', in id. and Wienfort (eds.), Adel und Moderne,157-76.
31. On this see, among others, Pomp, 'Brandenburgischer Landadel'; Stephanie Merkenich, Griine Front gegen Weimar: Reichs-Landbund und agrarischer Lobbyismus [9[8-[933 (Dusseldorf, 1998); Wolfram Pyta, Dorfiemeinschaft und Parteipolitik [9[8-[933: Die Verschriinkung von Milieu und Parteien in den protestantischen Landgebieten Deutschlands in der Weimarer Republik (Dusseldorf, 1996); and Mechthild Hempe, Liindliche Gesellschaft in der Krise: Mecklenburg in der Weimarer Republik (Cologne, 2002).
32. On this see Ulrich Schuren, Der Volksentscheid zur Furstenenteignung 1926: Die Vermogensauseinantiersetzung mit den depossedierten Landesherren als Problem tier deutschen Innenpolitik unter besonderer Beriicksichtigung der Verhiiltnisse in Preuflen (Dusseldorf, 1978); Norbert Stieniczka, 'Die Vermoegensauseinandersetzung des Volksstaates Hessen und seiner Rechtsnachfolger mit der ehemals grossherzoglichen Familie 1918-1953', Archiv fiir hessische Geschichte und Altertumskunde, 56 (1998), 255-308; and Karl Heinrich Kaufhold, 'Furstenabfindung oder Furstenenteignung? Der Kampf um das Hausvermtigen der ehemals regierenden Fiirstenhauser imJahre 1926 und die Innenpolitik der Weimarer Republik', in Markus A. Denzel and Gunther Schulz (eds.), Deutscher Adel im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert: Budinger Forschungen zur Sozialgeschichte 2002 und 2003 (St Katharinen, 2004), 261-85.
33. On the Versailles syndrom see Hagen Schulze, 'Versailles', in Etienne Francois and Hagen Schulze (eds.), Deutsche Erinnerungsorte (Munich, 2001), 407-21; more recently Thomas Lorenz, ' "Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht!"-"Versailler Vertrag" und "Revision" als Diskurs- und Zeitgeistphanomene der Weimarer Republik 1919-1925' (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Marburg, 2005). On the aristocratic understanding of honour see Ute Frevert, Ehrenmiinner: Das Duell in tier burgerlichen Geselischaft (Munich, 1991), and the brief outline by Marcus Funck, 'Ehre', in Conze (ed.), Kleines Lexikon des Adels, 70-3·
34. On the political significance of the idea of the Reich in the Weimar Republic see, among others, Klaus Reimus, , "Das Reich mul3 uns doch bleiben!" Die nationale Rechte', in Detlef Lehnert and Klaus Megerle (eds.), Politische Identitiit und nationalc Gedenktage: Zur politischen Kultur in der Weimarer Republik (Opladen, 'g8g), 23'-53; and recently, with important observations on Catholicism, Vanessa Conze, Das Europa der Deutschen: Europaideen in Deutschland zwischen Reichstradition und Westorientierung, 1920-1970, Munich, 2005, 44-63.
35. On the attractiveness of National Socialism for the high aristocracy and members of the former ruling dynasties see Jonathan Petropolous, Royals and the Reich: The Princes if Hessen in Nazi Germany (Oxford, 2006).
36. On 'crisis' as a general concept see Reinhart Koselleck, 'Krise', in Otto Brunner et al. (eds.), Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: Historisches Lexikon zur politisch- sozialen Sprache in Deutschland (Stuttgart, 2004), iii. 617-50.
37. 'Crisis' is an important term in Horst Moller's survey, Europa zwischen den Weltkriegen (Munich, 1998); also Edward H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, (New York, 1964); Ernst Nolte, Die Krise des liberalen Systems und die jaschistischen Bewegungen (Munich, 1968); Karl Dietrich Bracher, Die Krise Europas seit 1917 (Frankfurt on Main, 1993); and Detlev J. K. Peukert, Die Weimarer Republik: Krisenjahre der Klassischen Modeme (Frankfurt am Main, 1987).
38. Andreas Wirsching, Vom Weltkrieg zum Burgerkrieg? Politischer Extremismus in Deutschland und Frankreich 1918-/933139: Berlin und Paris im Vergleich (Munich, 1999); see also Manfred Kittel, Provinz zwischen Reich und Republik: Politische Mentalitiiten in Deutschland und Frankreich 1918-1933 (Munich, 2000).
39. John Wheeler-Bennett, King George VI: His Life and Reign. London: Macmillan, 1958, 333.
40 Richard Hamilton, Who Voted for Hitler?, Princeton University Press, 1982, 413.
41. Princess
Sophia to Landgravine Margarethe, 27 February 1933, Private Papers of Rainer
von Hessen.
About the following list produced in 1941, Malinowski writes: “Bei einzelnen Familien ist das Kriterium fur ihre Verzeichnung auf dieser Liste unklar, NSDAP-Mitglieder gefuersteter Linien aus Familien des niederen Adels fehlen hingegen.” In other words, the following is only the high nobility who were members of the Nazi party, a list of the lower nobility according to Malinowski, is still missing. (Stephan Malinowski, Vom Konig zum Fuehrer: Sozialer Niedergang und politische Radikalisierung im deutschen Adel zwischen Kaiserreich und NS-Staat, Berlin, 2003, 507.)
