Similar excuses probably will be voiced again, enabling Khartoum to leave thousands of troops in the country’s oil-producing region. Most of Sudan’s oil wealth is concentrated in Unity state, but oil reserves also are spread out through much of southern Sudan — as are Khartoum’s forces — in states including Western Bahr al-Ghazal, Northern Bahr al-Ghazal and Warab. Unity state alone produces an estimated 80 percent of the country’s 500,000 barrels of oil per day and, not coincidentally, hosts thousands of Khartoum’s forces.
While some troops in non-oil producing states might be repositioned, Khartoum most likely never will voluntarily yield control of the nation’s oil region to the SPLM’s armed faction, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). At best, Khartoum will cooperate in joint patrols with specially trained SPLA units — whose commanders Khartoum can control. Training SPLA units to Khartoum’s standards will provide another possible delay for a southern withdrawal, since Khartoum always changes those standards.
Khartoum faces
several insurgent threats, most notably in its Darfur region but also including
tensions with the SPLA — which have not entirely dissipated, despite a
tenuous peace agreement. Darfur’s rebel groups include the Justice and
Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudanese Liberation Army-Unity faction.
These groups have attacked government and African Union targets in Darfur
and have threatened to attack oil installations bordering Darfur, mainly
Chinese facilities.
China’s presence
in Africa seems to depend on the rebels’ ability to eventually step up
the scale of their attacks to a point at which Chinese companies’ operating
and oil-extraction activities are stopped or significantly slowed. The
worst incident to date was the April 24 attack against a Chinese oil exploration
facility in Ethiopia, where nine Chinese workers died. The Chinese did
not withdraw from Ethiopia after the attack. Given that the Sudan-based
energy assets in question are not exploration, but actual oil-extraction
facilities already in operation, providing 35,000 barrels a day, China’s
incentives to wait out the turbulence in Sudan are even higher.
Under pressure
to defend against these insurgent threats, Khartoum is unlikely to yield
the responsibility of protecting oil facilities to the Government of South
Sudan — especially when the latter’s desires for greater autonomy and a
larger share of oil revenues run contrary to Khartoum’s interests.
On 19 Dec.
2007, for example a The Justice and Equality Movement, a Darfuri rebel
group, has claimed responsibility for simultaneous attacks against Sudan’s
armed forces in Darfur and against the country’s Defra oil field.
A few thousand members of the Sudanese armed forces might be redeployed northward as a gesture of good faith in the face of the Jan. 9 withdrawal deadline. But those troops likely will be found in noncritical (e.g., non-oil producing) southern states. Khartoum will never willingly cede control of the oil-producing states.
