The 1989 collapse of the Soviet Union and Russia’s subsequent loss of influence in its near abroad and in the West laid the foundation for Russia’s current geopolitical trajectory. Russia’s resurgence under President Vladimir Putin has involved a strong effort to regain the influence, respect and national security it believes it is due. Moscow’s desire is especially keen given previous Russian humiliations -- particularly those suffered by the government of the late Boris Yeltsin, when the West encroached on what Russia perceives as its prerogatives. Russia, however, lacks many of the tools the Soviet Union had at its disposal for compelling other countries’ behavior. This complicates Putin’s effort to satisfy the Russian geopolitical imperative of establishing hegemony in its near abroad.
The Russian resurgence took a potentially fatal hit over Kosovo's Feb. 18 secession from Serbia. This was an issue of minor importance to the United States and most Western European countries, but a major threat to Russia’s effort to demonstrate its return to major power status. For Russia and Putin to survive the Kosovo insult, retribution elsewhere in the Russian near abroad was expected -- namely in the Caucasus, Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic states.
Ukraine’s dramatic about-face on NATO comes in the context of Kosovar independence. Ukraine’s pro-Western president, Viktor Yushchenko -- who came to power in his country’s 2004 Orange Revolution -- was clamoring as recently as a month ago for NATO membership, despite a lukewarm reception from the alliance. Rumor has it that Yushchenko’s sudden change at the NATO foreign ministers’ meeting in Brussels occurred after the Russian president literally ordered him to withdraw Ukraine’s NATO bid, probably reminding him of the aforementioned Russian economic leverage over Ukraine.
Putin likely did not rely on economic coercion alone, however, and we can assume the FSB helped change Ukraine’s mind on NATO. The FSB is quite good at pressuring individuals using threats, intimidation, enticements and even sophisticated assassinations.
Yushchenko knows the capabilities of the secret service underworld well, having barely survived a poisoning while seeking office in 2004.Russia and the FSB probably decided that bringing the existing Ukrainian leadership in line would be easier than introducing a new leadership, allowing Moscow to avoid the pitfalls of Ukrainian politics. Given the lukewarm reception to Ukraine’s membership bid, Kiev could simply have let its application fall by the wayside. Instead, it made an active policy reversal. Compelling Yushenko’s U-turn on Ukraine’s NATO bid thus represents a significant Russian achievement, one that others -- particularly particularly Georgia-- will observe closely.
In fact Russia also indicated it would reconsider its position on possibly recognizing the two secessionist regions of Western-backed Georgia. By prodding South Ossetia to demand independence and Abkhazia to cause tensions along the Georgian border to flare up, Russia is sending a not-so-subtle hint that Georgia’s territorial integrity could soon be compromised.
But several arrestors remain in play what the latter situation concerns today. First, neither region can do too much on its own. They need Russia to act on their behalf, but if Moscow were to recognize South Ossetian or Abkhazian independence, Russia would be opening a can of worms in its own territory given its multitude of secessionist regions --including Chechnya, Ingushetia and Dagestan, to name just a few. Second, a declaration of independence by Abkhazia or South Ossetia is tantamount to a declaration of war on Georgia. Such a decision is for Russia -- not South Ossetia or Abkhazia -- to make. Update March 10, 2008: Confirming our above assesment EU official today voiced fears that Russia may recognise Georgia's breakaway republic of Abkhazia.
Update March 27, 2008: France, Germany and a handful of other west European nations are sticking to their opposition to a U.S.-backed push to grant Ukraine and Georgia membership plans at next week's NATO summit, Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko said today that no NATO bases will be deployed in Ukraine if the former Soviet republic joins the military alliance as this would contradict the country's Constitution.
This oscillation between aligning with the West and placating Russian concerns has been the hallmark of the country’s behavior for some years now — if not historically. Structurally, Ukraine is divided between the people in the western part of the country, who want to align with the United States and Europe, and the people in the eastern part, who are looking eastward toward Moscow.
The ill-fated Orange Revolution of late 2004/early 2005 -- which failed to bring the country under Western influence -- complicated things. It exacerbated the divisions within the country, creating a stalemate between the two sides. Ukraine’s geopolitical position has failed to allow the country to break its dependence and past with Russia. As a result, on a larger geopolitical scale, the United States and Russia are locked in a long-term tug-of-war over Ukraine.?
In fact, Ukraine represents the major arena in which Cold War II is being played out between Washington and Moscow. Ukraine is of critical importance to both sides. For the United States, a successful extraction of the country from the influence of Moscow -- not to mention NATO’s arrival on Moscow’s doorstep -- means relegating Russia to the status of a declining regional power. Conversely, and more importantly, for Russia, it is not just about its efforts to revive the bipolar world, but it is an issue of survival.
The loss of Ukraine could critically weaken the Kremlin. It is not merely a buffer separating Russia from the West; it is integrated into the Russian industrial and agricultural base. This is why Moscow has been using the tool of natural gas cutoffs and coercion by the FSB to keep Ukraine’s leadership in check. Moreover, Moscow has laid out the consequences of Kiev teaming up with NATO, saying it will point missiles at its neighbor if it were part of the alliance.
Moscow can, however, take comfort from the fact that there is no consensus within the West regarding Ukraine’s entry into NATO. The Europeans, particularly Germany, do not share Washington’s level of enthusiasm for Kiev’s assimilation into NATO. Uninterrupted supply of Russian gas via Ukraine is of far greater value to the Central and Eastern Europeans than any grandiose plans to secure the downfall of Russia. It isn’t that Germany is against Ukraine joining the West, but that it would rather pick that fight another day -- preferably when Europe wasn’t so dependent on Russia for energy.
But it is Ukraine that is being tugged and pushed from all sides, leaving it to balance precariously between surviving with a very aggressive Russia to its east, ambivalence to its west and a Washington eager to use Kiev as its pawn to sic it to Moscow. For the next week, Ukraine will toe the line -- not accepting or rejecting the other and waiting for the United States and Russia to decide how far this battle will go.
