In p.3 we described the diplomatic climate among the top, players-- of what is now around one month ago (P.3 was published a bit later as the two former, on Nov.7 because it took us a week to double check the information).Then finally during the Annapolis meeting last week it was agreed in bacroom negotiations that there will be, no attack, and that all further talk about a ‘possible’ attack should be dropped. Hence the proposal prepared for and agreed upon during, the Annapolis meeting to underscore this with a report to be presented to the general media-- which happened to have been today.
In other words the United States released a new National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) today, Dec. 3. It said, "We judge with high confidence that in the fall of 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program." It went on to say, "Tehran's decision to halt its nuclear weapons program suggests it is less determined to develop nuclear weapons than we have been judging since 2005." It further said, "Our assessment that Iran halted the program in 2003 primarily in response to international pressure indicates Tehran's decisions are guided by a cost-benefit approach rather than a rush to a weapon irrespective of the political, economic and military costs."
No wonder the decision to release particularly this report, caused dismay with Olmert which we think was clearly visible on the picture we published around four days ago as taken during the first day of the Annapolis meeting:
Today also, the Arab turnout at the Middle East conference proved to be an illusion when Saudi King Abdullah walked into the GCC conference hall in Doha hand in hand with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The Iranian president was invited to the Gulf summit for the first time. The “moderate” Arab front against Iran, proudly presented by US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and prime minister Ehud Olmert, melted away to nothing. Presenting the NIE, Bush’s national security adviser Stephen Hadley said: “The estimate offers ground for hope that the problem can be solved diplomatically without the use of force, as the administration has being trying to do.”
In effect, Washington has taken the military option off the table shortly before Tehran’s Saeed Jalili slammed on diplomacy during a conversation he held with the European Union’s Javier Solana in London, Saturday, Dec. 1. Given the new decison by the US (to solve its Iraq problem) , after years of foot-dragging, Tehran has decided it has nothing to fear from the US and so why bother with further engagement over its nuclear program? Deputy foreign minister Saeed Jalili, the dour official who took over negotiations from the urbane Ali Larijani, did not mince his words with the Solana. According to the New York Times , Ahmadinejad’s close ally said: ‘Everything in the past is past, and with me, you start over,’” He added: ‘None of your proposals has any standing.” When Solana said that he was under the assumption that there would be continuity in the talks, Mr. Jalili told him he was wrong, the French official described the meeting as “a disaster,” adding “Jalili essentially said: ‘Everything that Larijani has proposed is a dead letter and we have to start from zero.’” The Iranian official is also quoted as saying: “There is no longer an Iranian nuclear problem,” and the only interlocutor recognized by Iran from now on would be the International Atomic Energy Agency, with whom he claimed Tehran had solved all its problems.
But as the report
makes clear, initially, the intelligence on the Iranian nuclear program
consisted of a great number of pieces, many of which were inherently ambiguous
and could be interpreted in multiple ways. Second, the weight of evidence
for there being an Iranian nuclear program was shaded by the political
proclivities of the administration, which saw the threat of a U.S. strike
as intimidating Iran, and the weapons program discussion as justifying
it. Third, the change in political requirements on both sides made a new
assessment useful. This last has certainly been the case in all things
Middle Eastern since the Annapolis meeting; issues ranging from the Palestinians
to Syria to U.S. forces in Iraq. Including as we now have seen the evidence
of, the fact the White House has opted for minimizing the Iranian
nuclear arms threat rather than confronting it.
Thus one certainly
will also see some movement on Iraq (a prime concern for the US as it wants
to put its citizens at easy preferable now and at least no later than when
a new President takes office), between the United States and Iran. Certainly
the major blocker from the U.S. side has been removed and the success of
U.S. policies of late should motivate the Iranians. In any case, the entire
framework for U.S.-Iranian relations would appear to have shifted, and
with it the structure of geopolitical relations throughout the region.
In fact for the past 4-5 years, Washington and Tehran have been engaged in on-again, off-again negotiations over Iraq's future. In these talks the Iranians have been at a sizable disadvantage. The United States has more than 100,000 troops in the country, while Iran's leverage is largely limited to its influence with many of the country's Shiite militias. This influence is a useful tool for denying the United States the ability to impose its desires, though it is not a powerful enough one to allow the Iranians to turn their own preferences into reality.
Moreover, given that the majority of Iran's population is either in or behind the Zagros Mountains it may be difficult to invade, but it lacks military expeditionary capability. Its infantry-heavy army is designed for population control, not power projection. Therefore, for Iran to have a lever in manipulating events in its region, it must develop other playing cards. Its nuclear program is one of those cards. Iran has had a vested interest in convincing the world, unofficially, of course, that it possesses a nuclear program. For Iran, the nuclear program is a trump card to be traded away, not a goal in and of itself.
As to the U.S. motive, it also wanted to play up the nuclear threat. Part of Washington's negotiation strategy has been to isolate Iran from the rest of the international community. Charges that Iran desired nukes were an excellent way to marshal international action. Both sides had a vested interest in making Iran look the part of the wolf.That no longer is the case. There are only two reasons the U.S. government would choose to issue a report that publicly undermines the past four years of its foreign policy: a deal has been struck, or one is close enough that an international diplomatic coalition is no longer perceived as critical. This level of coordination across all branches of U.S. intelligence could not happen without the knowledge and approval of the CIA director, the secretaries of defense and state, the national security adviser and the president himself. This is not a power play; this is the real deal.
The full details of any deal are unlikely to be made public any time soon because the U.S. and Iranian publics probably are not yet ready to consider each other as anything short of foes. But the deal is by design integrated into both states' national security posture. It will allow for a permanent deployment of U.S. forces in Iraq to provide minimal national security for Iraq, but not in large enough numbers to be able to launch a sizable attack against Iran. It will allow for the training and equipping of the Iraqi military forces so that Iraq can defend itself, but not so much that it could boast a meaningful offensive force. It will integrate Iranian intelligence and military personnel into the U.S. effort so there are no surprises on either side.
But those are the details. Here is the main thrust: Ultimately, both sides have nursed deep-seated fears. The Iranians do not want the Americans to assist in the rise of another militaristic Sunni power in Baghdad, the last one inflicted 1 million Iranian casualties during 1980-1988 war. The United States does not want to see Iran dominate Iraq and use it as a springboard to control Arabia; that would put some 20 million barrels per day of oil output under a single power. The real purpose of the deal is to install enough bilateral checks in Iraq to ensure that neither nightmare scenario happens.
Should such an arrangement stick, the two biggest winners obviously are the Americans and Iranians. That is not just because the two no longer would be in direct conflict, and not just because both would have freed up resources for other tasks.U.S. geopolitical strategy is to prevent the rising of a power on a continental scale that has the potential to threaten North America. It does this by favoring isolated powers that are resisting larger forces. As powerful as Iran is, it is the runt of the neighborhood when one looks past the political lines on maps and takes a more holistic view. Sunnis outnumber Shia many times over, and Arabs do the same of Persians. Indeed, Persians make up only roughly half of Iran's population, making Tehran consistently vulnerable to outside influence. Simply put, the United States and Iran - because of the former's strategy and the latter's circumstances, are natural allies.
On the flip side, the biggest losers are those entities that worry about footloose and fancy-free Americans and Iranians. The three groups at the top of that list are the Iraqis, the Russians and the Arabs. Washington and Tehran will each sell out their proxies in Iraq in a heartbeat for the promise of an overarching deal. Now is the time for the Kurds, Sunni and Shia of Iraq to prove their worth to either side; those who resist will be smears on the inside of history's dustbin.
Separately, a core goal of U.S. foreign policy is to ensure that the Russians never again threaten North America, and to a lesser degree, Europe. An America that is not obsessed with Tehran is one that has the freedom to be obsessed with Moscow. And do not forget that the last state to occupy portions of Iran was not the United States, but Russia. Persia has a long memory and there are scores to settle in the Caucasus.
Back in the Middle East, U.S. foreign policy has often supported the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, favoring the weak against the strong in line with the broad strategy discussed above. A United States that does not need to contain Iran is a United States that can leverage an Iran that very much wishes to be leveraged. That potentially puts the Arabs on the defensive on topics ranging from investment to defense. The Arabs tend to get worried whenever the Americans or the Iranians look directly at them; that is nothing compared to the emotions that will swirl the first time that Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and U.S. President George W. Bush shake hands.
We expect the days and weeks ahead to be obfuscated by a blizzard of activity as various players in Washington and Tehran attempt to both directly engage and (still) prepare the ground for a final deal. Much will be dramatic, much will be contradictory, much will make no sense whatsoever. This is, after all, still the Middle East. But keep this in mind: With the nuclear issue out of the way, the heavy lifting has already been done and some level of understanding on Iraq's future already is in place. All that remains is working out the "details."
