As has been true since the beginning, this issue is not about Kosovo — or even Serbia. It is about Russia. Moscow sees Belgrade as its only ally in the European theater, and just as shearing off Kosovo from Serbia would set a precedent for Europe ignoring Serbia, so too would it set a precedent for Europe ignoring Russia. With the Kremlin moving aggressively to reassert its power throughout the former Soviet space, the last thing Moscow wants is to be perceived as a state that can be resisted, much less ignored.
Luckily (for the Kremlin), Moscow has any number of military and economic tools to use against the Europeans, ranging from the disposition of the Kremlin’s mammoth military forces to Russia’s control of one-fourth of all the oil and natural gas that Europe uses. None of these options would be savored in Europe, but it is not clear that the Europeans actually fear Russia’s implicit threats; they might actually be serious about dismissing such threats as mere bluster.
So this EU Kosovo force is now the issue of the month. The question, of course, is not just how competent such a force will be, but how competent it is intended to be. Kosovo has been synonymous with lawlessness since long before the 1999 NATO-Yugoslav war split it off from Serbia proper. The removal of Serbian authority at the tail end of that war has made the region a smuggler’s paradise. To imagine that 1,800 Europeans - especially if a sizable minority of them are bureaucrats - can cobble together a functional judicial and police network in the legal no-man’s-land of Kosovo on anything resembling a reasonable timeframe truly boggles the mind.
Instead of a clear signpost toward finality on the issue of Kosovo, this force might be another waffle. If one is of the opinion that the force is tightly linked to the independence issue, then it is a bold European move to break the logjam and run roughshod over Serbia’s — and Russia’s — wishes. If one believes that the force is merely a placeholder maintaining the status quo under a slightly different formula, then this is Europe’s method of heading off a confrontation with Russia and putting the issue back into the icebox for a few more months or years.
Of course, there is another player in this game that is not all that interested in protecting the Russian ego or heading off a European-Russian confrontation: the Kosovars. Prime Minister Hashim Thaci has shortened the time until his planned announcement of unilateral Kosovar independence from months to weeks, and now to mere days.
Until now, Russian resistance has succeeded in convincing the Europeans to hold the Kosovars back. For Thaci, Feb. 3 is his first “not before then” date. Thaci’s freshman status - he only came to power in late 2007 - raises three possibilities. First, Russian intimidation will again prevail and the European force is simply a delaying tactic that looks good on paper. Second, the Europeans are calling the Russian bluff, and it will be up to Russia to decide whether to escalate matters. Third, the Europeans are trying to delay, but Thaci will declare anyway and prompt Russia to strike against a hesitant Europe.
