The formal details of the meetings are uninspiring, but the summit is of critical importance — because of both what it achieved and what it did not.Typically, such discussions result in nothing but framing the talks for the next summit. Plus at present, it appears that Putin’s top hat is empty, and his only victory was proving to the world he could still summon the CIS at will. Information from Kremlin sources suggests that Putin’s bilateral meetings fell more into the realm of relationship management — smoothing away the rough edges before Putin’s official transfer of the presidency to his anointed successor, Dmitry Medvedev. Putin shored up Russia’s dominant position in Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, Moldova, Belarus and Tajikistan while pushing for stronger economic involvement in Ukraine. None of the talks were earth-shattering; all fit with longstanding Russian policy. There certainly was nothing that would spook the West.
The most interesting bilateral meeting was Putin’s sit-down with Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili, who normally is vitriolic about all things Russian but was more than gracious about Russia in general and Putin in particular. It is easy to see why: Tbilisi is terrified that Russia will use Kosovo’s independence as a precedent to call for the independence of Georgia’s two separatist regions, both of which are hugely pro-Russian. Putin, however, seemed to accept Saakashvili’s groveling and even rewarded him by announcing an imminent end to Russian trade and travel restrictions that have put a crimp in Georgia’s economy for more than a year — restrictions imposed due to Saakashvili’s past anti-Russian behavior. In exchange, it appears there was talk of Georgia informally agreeing to abandon its NATO membership ambitions.
If Tbilisi does back away from its plans to join NATO, this certainly would be the most strategically significant outcome of the summit. But Saakashvili could never announce such a deal publicly and survive back home. If Putin did achieve any strategic gains to mitigate his loss on Kosovo — in Georgia or anywhere else — they will only be realized after the various CIS leaders return to their respective countries and adjust policy. This is not exactly the public victory that Putin so deeply needs.
The most important parts of the summit were the meetings that did not take place. During the summit and the days preceding it, Putin did not hold bilateral talks with the leaders of Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan. These three Central Asian states are the ones working most aggressively with the Chinese to shift their economies away from Russia. Rail projects and pipelines that will move these countries’ economic postures eastward already are under construction. In fact, a new Chinese-Central Asian natural gas pipeline broke ground while the summit was going on. Once completed, these projects will reduce, if not outright eliminate, these three states’ dependence on Russian infrastructure.
All this means that the Kremlin is now in a double bind. It needs a public victory against the West to offset the humiliation of Kosovo, as well as something to frighten the Chinese away from carving off Central Asia. This will require more than just a hastily arranged summit.
What Next with Kosovo?
Serbian riot police guarding the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade abandoned their positions Feb. 21 during protests of the West’s broad approval of the independence of Serbia’s breakaway province of Kosovo. The gap allowed protesters to break into the building’s forward atrium and light fires. Similar, albeit less dramatic, attacks occurred at other Western embassies. The U.S. Embassy ultimately survived, but the inability — or potential unwillingness — of the Serbian police to protect the structure raised the hackles even of European governments who sided with Serbia in opposing the Feb. 19 Kosovar declaration of independence.
Serbs perceive Kosovo as the birthplace of their nationality, and to say that most Serbs are furious about the West’s support for its independence is a gross understatement. Additional government-sponsored protests in Serbia are scheduled for this weekend, and they have presented the Serbian government with a dilemma from which there is no easy escape.
If the government continues to allow the Serbs to blow off steam by attacking Western embassies, it will force a deep and lasting breach between Belgrade and the West. Protection of embassy property is one of the few rules of international conduct that is (nearly) always followed. Granted, in the Serbian mind, that breach already exists because of Kosovo — but so far, the European Union has remained willing to put Serbia on an accelerated path toward membership. Additional attacks against Western embassies will not only close off that path but also trigger recriminations that will clearly demonstrate to Serbia how nonexistent its other options are. Serbia is wholly surrounded by states that are either members or protectorates of the European Union and NATO. Strategically, it has no other nonsuicidal options.
Alternately, Belgrade could defend the embassies; it certainly has the manpower and the experience with crowd control to do so. But in using force to protect the embassies of states that many Serbs see as responsible for Kosovar independence, the government would discredit itself in the eyes of much of the populace.
Serbia’s Interior Ministry falls under the direct control of Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica, who has proven to be a master of political manipulation and maneuvering. But he has done this by being kingmaker and turning his competitors against each other. While we certainly are not counting him out, protection of the embassies very clearly falls to him. And should a nationalist wave destroy Kostunica, it would certainly destroy the pro-Western coalition allies in the government who have been less fervent on the issue of Kosovo.
The one winner from Serbia’s dilemma is Moscow. Russia has encouraged Serbian intransigence and hostility in order to drag out the Kosovo issue for years. This was not done out of any love for Serbia, but because the issue served to distract the West from anything that Moscow might be up to farther east. Now that Kosovo has formally broken with Serbia, and Belgrade is locked in a geopolitical prison, the Kosovo issue is no longer of use to Moscow. But that does not mean Russia is going to disengage just yet.
From Moscow’s perspective, Belgrade has one final distraction to perform. The Serbian government appears to be on the verge of either becoming a deep pariah in the West’s eyes or shattering under the strain — and being replaced with a new government that would become a deep pariah in the West’s eyes. Either way, those Western eyes are going to have something loud and fiery to focus on in Belgrade for a while.
For the Russians, it matters little that this will be the end of their Serbian ally; Moscow is more concerned about losing international prestige because its objections to Kosovo’s independence were ignored. The Kremlin cares little for what happens to Serbia, so long as Belgrade keeps distracting the West.
Conclusion
It is interesting to note the extent to which the Serbs and Russians have focused on the United States in this dispute. Europe — particularly the United Kingdom, Germany and France — was at least as heavily involved in the independence decision. The Europeans more so than the Americans, in fact, because they were the ones who offered to send a peacekeeping force to administer an independent Kosovo. The Russians at one point tried to reach over the Europeans’ heads, appealing to the United States not to participate in recognition. But at this point, the rhetoric in Moscow and Belgrade treats the situation as if the United States were the primary actor. This could be due to the fact that both Russia and Serbia have more important economic relations with the Europeans than with the United States, or it might have to do with their belief that Europe is merely acting on Washington’s wishes. Either way, both the Russians and the Serbs have chosen to focus on the United States as the main actor.
In the end it seems that the question that faces the Kremlin is this: Having declared Serbia to be an ally and proclaimed that the Serbs have been mistreated, what exactly do the Russians plan to do about it? If they simply wanted to back off, they could have taken any number of opportunities to shift their position. We have to assume that they have a plan. It is possible that they will offer Belgrade weapons — that would be provocative without direct action taken. They already have excellent economic relations with Serbia. They might sweeten the pot to show the Europeans that Serbia and others have alternatives besides the European Union. Either way, the Russians now have to put up or shut up. They have to show what the consequence will be for the United States’ and Europe’s disregard for Russian wishes, or Moscow will simply be seen as engaged in empty posturing.
