In return, Kosovo
Albanians are holding off a unilateral declaration of independence
from Serbia until early next year.They are wary of pushing the Serbian
general elections next year into returning the ultra-nationalist Radical
Party now in opposition. Kosovo independence is fully supported by the
US and all the European Union members, barring Cyprus. Russia which stands
behind Belgrade calls for more negotiations. Foreign minister Sergey Lavrov
warned Monday that UDI could set off a chain reaction of secessions across
the world including Europe.
Last week,
an adviser to Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica warned Belgrade
would defend Kosovo with "all available means" in case of a unilateral
declaration.
The Serbian government is preparing a "top secret" plan with several options to use against Kosovo if it declares independence. One such option that has apparently already been planned out in detail is cutting off electricity to Kosovo.
Kosovo depends on Serbia for 40 percent of its electricity. A cutoff would be devastating to its economy, particularly during the frigid winter months (which last well into May in the mountainous south-central Balkans).
Just south of Kosovo, Macedonia would be seriously affected as well, as it depends on electricity imports for up to a quarter of its needs. Macedonia could import electricity from Greece or Bulgaria, but Greece itself often has blackouts and would not be a reliable alternative, and Bulgarian electricity would have to come through the same Serbian network that would be affected by the cutoff.
Bosnian power would be the most serious alternative for Kosovo, but Bosnian electricity would have to traverse two further obstacles: unreliable Montenegrin infrastructure and the Serbian-dominated Republika Srpska. Furthermore, Macedonia and Kosovo's electricity networks are in disarray, even by southwest Balkan standards, and would have a difficult time switching to a different source.
Serbia does
not have any real means of preventing Kosovo's independence, but an electricity
cutoff would give it a chance to play politics at home and punish the Albanians
in Kosovo.
Serbia a few
days ago promised NATO's visiting Admiral Mark Fitzgerald, that it will
not use force against Kosovo.
Hanging precariously between peace and conflict Serbia also opened a new government office in Mitrovica, Kosovo today ( Dec. 10).On the surface, opening a new Serbian government office in northern Kosovo sounds like routine administration. The Serbian government provides many public services to ethnic Serbs living in Kosovo, who do not trust Kosovo's semiautonomous regional services, run by ethnic Albanians. The Serbian minister who cut the ribbon at the office's opening Dec. 10 said the it is meant to "intensify" these public services. But U.N. spokesman Alexander Ivanko called the opening "a provocative act" and questioned the motive for greater Serbian presence in Kosovo at this time.
On the surface, opening a new Serbian government office in northern Kosovo sounds like routine administration. The Serbian government provides many public services to ethnic Serbs living in Kosovo, who do not trust Kosovo's semiautonomous regional services, run by ethnic Albanians. The Serbian minister who cut the ribbon at the office's opening Dec. 10 said the it is meant to "intensify" these public services. But U.N. spokesman Alexander Ivanko called the opening "a provocative act" and questioned the motive for greater Serbian presence in Kosovo at this time.
Tensions were downplayed at a meeting between Serbian President Boris Tadic and his army chiefs of staff Dec. 12, where Lt. Zdravko Ponos called Kosovo stable and emphasized the importance of good relations with KFOR. Similarly, Defense Minister Dragan Sutanovac said Dec. 11 that he has confidence in KFOR's ability to prevent violence from erupting in the region. These assurances, however, do not reflect the extent to which Serbia's military and government are divided over Kosovo. The force of a Serbian backlash against a secessionist Kosovo could overwhelm cooler heads in Serbia's military; it also could take the form of paramilitary activity.
The location of the Mitrovica office matters. Northern Kosovo is the economic heart of Kosovo and is home to nearly 80,000 Serbs who mostly have refused to be assimilated into the rest of the province, despite U.N. attempts to create regional unity. NATO and its allies have good reason to suspect that Serbia is positioning itself to retain northern Kosovo if the province declares independence. Northern Kosovo thus would constitute the fault line along which conflict played out.
Foreseeing the potential for violence, KFOR recently rotated 90 U.S. soldiers out of reserves and the French-led northern Multinational Task Force, which is headquartered in Novo Selo but includes Mitrovica and Donje Zabare. KFOR says the rotation was merely routine, but it seems unlikely to be coincidental that Americans were rotated into a camp just north of Mitrovica a week before the Dec. 10 diplomatic deadline. Even 90 U.S. troops could boost the responsive capability of the northern task force, which - aside from the French - includes Danish, Moroccan, Belgian and Greek troops. Meanwhile, 1,600 more troops in Europe have been put on standby in case violence erupts. The multinational force's French leadership certainly will need all the help it can get to maintain order in the North if Kosovo secedes.
The wildcard in all this is Russia. As long as Moscow limits its support for Serbia to words and does not commit troops or other military support, the violence that is likely to erupt in Kosovo might be limited to the North. For shure if Kosovo declares independence unilaterally, Russia will 'officially' request that the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) abrogate the act.
Like we suggested in our conclusion on Nov.18, the West will postpone independence again, but the Albanians might force the issue by declaring unilateral independence. The Russians would actually be delighted to see this. But here is the basic fact: For the United States and its allies, Kosovo is a side issue of no great importance. For the Russians, it is both a hot-button issue and a strategic opportunity. The Russians won't roll over this time. And the asymmetry of perceptions is what crises are made of.
Putin wants to demonstrate that Russia is a great power. That would influence thinking throughout the former Soviet Union, sobering eastern Central Europe as well, and Poland in particular. Confronting the West as an equal and backing it into a corner is exactly what he would like. In our view, Putin will seize the Kosovo issue not because it is of value in and of itself but because it gives him a platform to move his strategic policy forward.
The Germans have neither the resources nor the appetite for such a crisis. The Americans, bogged down in the Islamic world, are hardly in a position to deal with a crisis over Kosovo. The Russian view is that the West has not reviewed its policies in the Balkans since 1999 and has not grasped that the geopolitics of the situation have changed. Nor, in our view, has Washington or Berlin grasped that a confrontation is exactly what the Russians are looking for.
